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ABSTRACT 
 
The government implements various programs and policies with the intention of 
increasing social welfare. While it is important to evaluate the effects of these initiatives, 
conducting experiments to determine the implications of public policies is usually 
expensive and in many cases infeasible. In my dissertation, I employ different causal 
inference methodologies to identify the causal effects of public policies that affect the 
society at large. 
In the first chapter of my dissertation, I study the effect of the Minimum Legal 
Drinking Age (MLDA) in altering the drinking behavior of individuals and thereby its 
effect on sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). Results show no evidence of an increase 
in STDs at the MLDA in the overall population, in racial subgroups, or in counties with 
the highest infection rates. The second chapter is an evaluation of the effects of the Section 
8 housing voucher program on the criminal outcomes of its recipients. Using a housing 
voucher lottery, we find that voucher receipt increases violent crime arrests mainly for 
individuals with a history of arrest and for men. I study a specialized police intervention, 
called the Lethality Assessment Program, which identifies and empowers the most high-
risk victims of domestic violence. I find that this proactive approach of law enforcement 
towards domestic violence incidents reduced female homicide victimization by men by 35 
to 45 percent. Overall, my dissertation sheds light on the effectiveness of public policies 
and their intended and unintended consequences. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Public policies and programs affect various aspects of life for large populations. These 
policies and programs are implemented with an aim to achieve certain objectives, but 
oftentimes they might not work as intended or might also have unintended consequences 
that could be positive or negative. Therefore, it is important for policy makers to evaluate 
whether the benefit of a policy exceeds the cost of implementing it. While it is usually 
straightforward to calculate the cost of implementation of a public policy or social welfare 
program, analyzing its effects on important outcomes is difficult due to the lack of an 
experimental approach in their implementation. Specifically, in the absence of randomly 
chosen control and treatment groups, it is difficult to disentangle the causal effects of a 
program from the effects of other confounding factors that might influence the outcomes 
of the control and treated groups differently. As a solution, a variety of causal inference 
techniques have been developed in the field of Applied Microeconomics. In this 
dissertation, I analyze the causal effects of three public policies/programs using different 
experimental and quasi-experimental methodologies. 
The first chapter of my dissertation studies the effect of the Minimum Legal Drinking 
Age (MLDA) in altering the drinking behavior of individuals and thereby its effect on 
sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). The MLDA provides legal access to alcohol to 
individuals on their 21st birthday and has been shown to cause large increases in drinking 
(Carpenter and Dobkin 2015). However, we cannot compare the STD rates in populations 
below and above 21 years of age because these groups may also differ in other factors, 
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such as sexual health awareness and access to condoms, which affect STD rates. To 
overcome this issue, using confidential administrative data from California, I implement 
a regression discontinuity model which compares the number of gonorrhea cases in men 
who differ in age by less than a month, but are diagnosed just before and after their 21st 
birthday. Results show no evidence of an increase in STDs in the overall population, or in 
racial subgroups and counties with the highest infection rates. This suggests that while the 
increase in drinking at the MLDA has negative consequences such as higher mortality and 
crime (Carpenter and Dobkin 2009; 2015), the same is not true for STDs. 
The second chapter looks at the effect of the largest federal housing assistance program 
in the United States, “Housing Choice Voucher Program,” on crime. This program, which 
is more popularly known as “Section 8,” is designed to provide in-kind transfers to low 
income families in the form of vouchers so they can get access to privately owned housing 
which would otherwise be unaffordable. Identifying the causal effect of the vouchers is 
difficult as families choose to participate in the program and a comparable control group 
is not readily available. Even among low-income families, those that choose to participate 
in the program might be different from those that do not in unobservable ways. Taking 
advantage of a housing lottery that randomized the timing at which families were enrolled 
into the program, we estimate the causal effects of the vouchers through an experimental 
approach. The data include information on voucher recipients from the Houston Housing 
Authority and arrest records from the Houston Police Department. Results show that this 
form of assistance has unintended consequences. Voucher recipients were more likely to 
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get arrested for violent crime after receiving the vouchers. Further analysis reveals that 
these increases in crime are driven by recipients with a history of crime and by men. 
In the third chapter, I evaluate a police intervention called the Lethality Assessment 
Program, which aims to reduce intimate partner homicide. Under this program, the police 
officers take a more proactive approach at the scene of a domestic violence incident. They 
use a short, simple questionnaire to screen the victims and identify those most at risk of 
being seriously injured or killed by their intimate partners. The high-risk victims are then 
connected to a domestic violence counselor, given a safety plan, and actively encouraged 
to seek help. I study the effectiveness of this program by exploiting the variation in the 
timing of implementation of LAP across law enforcement agencies in Maryland, where 
the program was first developed. Results indicate that the program reduced female 
homicide victimization by males by 35-45 percent. This translates to a reduction of 2-3 
female fatalities annually for a population of 1 million. 
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2. THE EFFECT OF THE MINIMUM LEGAL DRINKING AGE ON SEXUALLY 
TRANSMITTED DISEASES: REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY EVIDENCE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that around 20 
million new sexually transmitted infections occur each year in the United States, with 
almost half of them infecting adolescents and young adults between the ages of 15 and 24. 
The total number of prevalent infections is estimated to be around 110 million, which 
result in annual expenditures of $16 billion in direct medical costs (CDC 2013 STD 
Factsheet). Studies showing positive links between drinking and risky sexual behaviors, 
such as having multiple partners (e.g., Welsh, Grello, and Harper 2006) and engaging in 
unprotected sex (Grossman and Markowitz 2005), make it critical to understand the extent 
to which alcohol use affects the spread of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs).  
Researchers in various fields have studied the influence of alcohol on risky sexual 
behavior. On the one hand, physiological effects of alcohol include decreased testosterone 
levels which can reduce libido and sexual performance (e.g. Mendelson, Mello, and 
Ellingboe 1977). On the other hand, psychological effects such as cognitive impairment 
(Hull and Bond 1986) and relief of social anxiety (Steele and Josephs 1990) might lead to 
decreased rational judgment in the choice of sexual partners and in the decision to use 
protection. Increased aggression and sex drive under the influence of alcohol have also 
been documented (e.g. Hull and Bond 1986). Therefore, estimating the impact of drinking 
on risky sexual behavior remains an empirical question.  
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However, establishing a causal link between alcohol consumption and risky sexual 
behavior is difficult due to selection into drinking. Specifically, the worry is that an 
unobserved confounding variable, such as a preference for risky behavior, may cause an 
individual to engage in both drinking and unsafe sex. To overcome this problem, 
researchers have often used variation in alcohol prices (and taxes) and other alcohol related 
policies as sources of variation in alcohol consumption.1  
Whereas, I address this question in this paper by exploiting the sudden change in legal 
access to alcohol at exactly age 21, in a regression discontinuity (RD) design, to study the 
corresponding change in the likelihood of contracting an STD.2 The Minimum Legal 
Drinking Age (MLDA) grants individuals legal access to alcohol on their 21st birthday 
and has been shown to cause a significant increase in both drinking participation and 
frequency (Carpenter and Dobkin 2009; Carpenter and Dobkin 2011; Yörük and Yörük 
2011; Carpenter and Dobkin 2015). Given these first stage effects, I use administrative 
count data from California to test for a discrete change in gonorrhea rates in men at age 
21. The data cover all cases of gonorrhea in the state of California that are diagnosed in 
                                                 
1 Alcohol prices and beer taxes have been used as instruments for consumption to study the impacts of 
drinking on condom use (Grossman and Markowitz 2005; Markowitz, Kaestner, and Grossman 2005), 
teenage abortions (Sen 2003), and state level STD rates (Chesson, Harrison, and Kassler 2000; Markowitz, 
Kaestner, and Grossman 2005). State-level variation in legal drinking ages has been used in a difference-in-
differences framework to study the effects of drinking on STD rates (Chesson, Harrison, and Kassler 2000), 
teen child-bearing (Dee 2001), and infant health outcomes (Fertig and Watson 2009). The effect of the "Zero 
Tolerance" drunk driving laws on STD rates among the underage population has also been studied in a 
similar framework using state-level variation in these laws (Carpenter 2005). But, some concerns have been 
raised about alcohol prices (and taxes) being weak instruments for consumption (Chaloupka and Wechsler 
1996; Rashad and Kaestner 2004) and about the timing of the changes to the legal drinking age across states 
being endogenous (Miron and Tetelbaum 2009). 
2 This identification strategy was first used by Carpenter and Dobkin (2009) to study the effect of drinking 
on mortality. 
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men in the age group of 17 to 25 during the time period from 2000 to 2012. Importantly, 
I observe the exact age (in days) at the time of diagnosis, and gonorrhea in men is typically 
diagnosed within two weeks from the time of exposure. Since only the time of diagnosis 
is observed and not the time of contraction, this short time span between infection and 
diagnosis is critical for this research design. 
In exploiting the discontinuity in drinking at age 21, this paper is close to a study by 
Ertan Yörük and Yörük (2015) (henceforth E&Y) who use the same approach and 
confidential data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to study the effect of 
increased drinking at the MLDA on risky sexual behavior. While they find a discontinuous 
increase in the likelihood of an individual engaging in sexual activity at age 21, they do 
not find a statistically significant change in the frequency of sexual activity or in the 
likelihood of using a condom (or any other form of birth control) in the most recent sexual 
intercourse. This is an important contribution since most of the existing literature has 
documented a positive relationship between drinking and risky sexual behavior.  
This paper differs from and complements E&Y (2015) in several ways. First, the 
outcomes of interest in E&Y (2015) are self-reported measures of risky sexual behavior 
from the NLSY, whereas I focus instead on clinically diagnosed STDs. I argue that while 
it is important to know the behavioral response to increased drinking, the impact on STDs 
is likely of more direct interest to policy-makers and public health professionals. In 
addition, an important advantage of this study is that it relies on administrative data, which 
cover the universe of gonorrhea infections in California diagnosed in males over a 13 year 
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period, rather than survey responses, and this helps avoid common worries about using 
self-reported data on a topic like risky sexual behavior.3 
The advantage of the regression discontinuity research design is that it offers a clean 
and intuitive way of identifying the effect of the MLDA and the associated increase in 
drinking on STDs. The identifying assumption is that all determinants of STDs, other than 
legal access to alcohol, trend smoothly across the age 21 cutoff. This assumption is likely 
to hold because there is little to no incentive for individuals to manipulate their date of 
birth at the time of STD diagnosis, and all confounding factors other than legal access to 
alcohol are expected to be no different, on average, in the populations just below and 
above the age 21 cutoff. Therefore, any discontinuous increase in gonorrhea rates at this 
cutoff can be interpreted as the causal effect of the MLDA.   
Results show no evidence of an increase in STD rates at the MLDA. All point 
estimates are negative, and none are statistically different from zero. In addition, I find no 
evidence of an increase in STDs even within racial subgroups and counties with the 
highest infection rates. Importantly, the estimates are sufficiently precise to rule out a 1.6 
percent increase in the likelihood of contracting gonorrhea due to increased access to 
alcohol. In short, even though drinking increases significantly at age 21 among California 
residents, by around 31 percent (Carpenter and Dobkin 2015), the results indicate that this 
                                                 
3 For example, one might worry that respondents may not truthfully report risky sexual behavior that arises 
due to drinking, or that they may not be able to recall the details of risky sexual activity that occurred under 
the influence. In addition, the survey question in the NLSY only asks about condom use in the most recent 
sexual activity in the last four weeks, which may be a noisy measure of overall condom use. The NLSY also 
does not ask about the number of sexual partners. As a result, even if condom use does not change, 
individuals over age 21 who have risky sex may be doing so with more number of partners and thus be at a 
greater risk of contracting an STD. 
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additional drinking does not result in an increase in gonorrhea infection rates. The absence 
of an increase in STD rates at the MLDA of 21 years casts a doubt on the hypothesis that 
alcohol consumption, rather than a confounding factor, causes the spread of sexually 
transmitted infections. 
2.2 Background and Data 
One of the challenges in implementing an RD model to estimate the impact of the 
MLDA on outcomes is that researchers must observe the age of the individual at the time 
of occurrence of the outcomes. For example, in studying the effect of alcohol on mortality, 
Carpenter and Dobkin (2009) are able to calculate the exact age in days at the time of 
death with date of death and date of birth available to them. However, doing this in the 
case of STDs is difficult since the data typically only contain the date of diagnosis and not 
the date of contraction of (or exposure to) the infection.4 Since STDs may have long and 
unpredictable incubation periods, which also vary by gender, estimating the exact age at 
which the individual engaged in unsafe sex from the age at diagnosis is not 
straightforward. Given these difficulties, I focus on gonorrhea in men as it is diagnosed, 
in most cases, within a short time span of two weeks after exposure to the infection. 
Gonorrhea is a sexually transmitted bacterial infection. It is the third most common 
STD affecting teenagers and young adults in the age group of 15 to 24.5 According to 
CDC estimates, about 820,000 people are infected with gonorrhea annually in the US, of 
                                                 
4 Even if such a date is available in the data, it is likely to be self-reported and may not be reliable. 
5 The first two most common sexually transmitted infections in this age group are HPV and Chlamydia. 
Since these diseases are not usually diagnosed within a short period of time after exposure, they cannot be 
studied in an RD setting. 
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whom 70% (570,000) are between the ages of 15 and 24. The symptoms of gonorrhea in 
men include white, yellow, or green discharge from the penis, burning sensation while 
urinating, and painful or swollen testicles (Gonorrhea CDC Factsheet).6 These symptoms 
are difficult to ignore, and most or all of them appear within one to fourteen days after the 
exposure to the infection.7 Given the severity of these symptoms, we can expect men both 
below and above age 21 to be equally likely to seek medical help when they appear. Hence, 
there would be no reason to believe that a change in the probability of testing could explain 
the observed changes in gonorrhea rates.8 Gonorrhea is detected through a urine test and 
is treated with prescription antibiotics.9 Men who are infected with gonorrhea are, 
therefore, very likely to be diagnosed within two weeks of contracting it. This short time 
window between exposure and diagnosis allows me to estimate the age of the individual 
at the time of contracting the infection from his age at the time of diagnosis. Specifically, 
the age at contraction is estimated as follows: 
Age (in days) at Contraction = Age (in days) at Diagnosis – 7       (1.1) 
The ages at the time of contraction are likely to be estimated with a small margin of 
                                                 
6 The same is not true for women. Gonorrhea usually does not present any symptoms in women. See CDC 
Fact Sheet on Gonorrhea: http://www.cdc.gov/std/gonorrhea/stdfact-gonorrhea.htm  
7 Seven days is thought to be the typical incubation period for gonorrhea (Crawford et al. 1977). In a 
preventive drug trial (King et al. 1979), the mean incubation period was found to be between 3.4 and 5.6 
days, and among the men who were screened for asymptomatic gonorrhea, only 25 percent of them did not 
have any symptoms until the fourteenth day.  
8 Some of the men who are infected with gonorrhea may be asymptomatic. An increase in testing probability 
might cause an increase in the number of such asymptomatic gonorrhea cases detected. This would mean 
that my estimates indicate the upper bound of the increase in STDs at the MLDA. On the contrary, it is 
difficult to believe that legal access to alcohol and an increase in risky sexual behavior would cause those 
who do not show symptoms to be less likely to get tested. 
9 These antibiotics are not available over the counter. Since the individual would need a prescription, all 
diagnosed cases get reported to the CDPH. 
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error (of +/-7 days).10 Also, in some cases, the infected male might be asymptomatic and 
hence not be diagnosed within fourteen days of exposure.11 However, there are three 
important things to note. First, neither the proportion of asymptomatic gonorrhea cases 
nor this measurement error in the estimated age at contraction are likely to change 
discontinuously at the age 21 cutoff.12 As a result, the regression discontinuity estimates 
remain unbiased. Second, as a robustness check shown later, I estimate all the results with 
and without the cases diagnosed within the two weeks immediately after the 21st birthday. 
The results are robust to these exclusions. Third, all the estimates are measures of 
percentage changes in the number of sexually transmitted infections at the MLDA. 
Though the observed number of cases might be lower than the actual number of infections 
at a given age due to the cases of asymptomatic gonorrhea, the relative change is 
unaffected. 
The data are from the STD Control Branch of the California Department of Public 
Health (CDPH). They include information from all cases of males in the age group of 17 
to 25 diagnosed with gonorrhea between 2000 and 2012 in the state of California. The 
total sample size is 67,443. CDPH does not share individual level data due to privacy 
                                                 
10 For example, if a male gets diagnosed 3 days after exposure, the error in his estimated age at contraction 
is -4. For a male who is diagnosed 8 days after exposure, this error is +1. The error will thus vary between 
+/-7. Importantly, this error is likely to be the same on average on both sides of the age 21 cutoff. 
11 In the absence of symptoms, men usually get diagnosed with gonorrhea during routine STD screenings or 
at times through contact-tracing if they are named as sexual contacts of women diagnosed with gonorrhea. 
In a study that closely replicated the screening process by conducting routine checkups of individuals who 
had previously visited an STD clinic, 39.1 percent of the men diagnosed with gonorrhea were asymptomatic 
(Peterman 2006). In cases diagnosed through contact-tracing, the proportion of infected men who are 
asymptomatic ranges from 44 to 57 percent (Crawford et al. 1977). 
12 Though it is reasonable to think that the proportion of asymptomatic men diagnosed increases with age, 
it is not expected to jump discontinuously at exactly age 21. 
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concerns. As a result, I observe counts of gonorrhea cases aggregated by the exact age in 
days at the time of diagnosis. The data also include count breakdowns by race and by 
county groups based on infection rates.13  
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table A.1. On average, about 23 cases are 
diagnosed at every age measured in days between 17 and 25 years. Blacks have the largest 
number of occurrences with an average of about 7.4 cases diagnosed at every age in days. 
Close to 80 percent of the incidences of gonorrhea in this sample are in the 10 counties 
with the highest infection rates.  
The details of gonorrhea infection rates in California are presented in Table A.2. Panel 
A shows infection rates among males in 2012 broken down by race and age group. The 
infection rate for black males is close to five times that of Hispanic and white males. While 
the reported rates are higher for males than females, this is likely driven by differences in 
symptoms and probability of diagnosis between the genders. The infection rate for males 
is the highest in the age group of 20 to 24, with about 1 in every 290 men being diagnosed 
with gonorrhea in 2012. For black males in this age group, 1 individual out of every 78 
was found to be infected. Given such high infection rates, any change in the number of 
cases diagnosed at age 21 should be discernible. Panel B shows the infection rates across 
different counties from 2008 to 2012. The top 10 counties in the decreasing order of 
infection rate are listed. San Francisco had the highest infection rate, while Los Angeles 
had the highest number of infections. 
                                                 
13 Based on the gonorrhea infection rates from 2008 to 2012, counties were divided into 3 groups: Top 3, 
Top 4 to 10, and the rest. Information at individual county level was unavailable due to privacy concerns. 
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2.3 Empirical Approach 
Using the variation in alcohol access and consumption induced by the MLDA, I 
implement a regression discontinuity design to estimate their effect on the likelihood of 
contracting a sexually transmitted infection. Formally, I estimate the following equation: 
𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑎𝑔𝑒 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒21𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝑓1(𝑎𝑔𝑒) +  𝑓2(𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∗ 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒21𝑎𝑔𝑒) + 𝜀𝑎𝑔𝑒   (1.2) 
In this equation, 𝑎𝑔𝑒 is the age (in days) minus 21 years. 𝑎𝑔𝑒 is both the unit of 
observation and the running variable. 𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑎𝑔𝑒 is the log of the number of cases of 
gonorrhea where the individual was 𝑎𝑔𝑒 days away from his 21st birthday at contraction. 
𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒21𝑎𝑔𝑒  is a dummy variable indicating that 𝑎𝑔𝑒 is equivalent to being 21 years or 
older. 𝛽1, the main coefficient of interest, captures the percentage change in the number 
of gonorrhea cases at the MLDA. I also estimate the above equation using a negative 
binomial regression in which 𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑎𝑔𝑒 is the count of gonorrhea cases where the individual 
was 𝑎𝑔𝑒 days away from his 21st birthday at contraction. The interpretation of 𝛽1 is the 
same in both models. 
This empirical approach has been used in the past to study the effect of drinking on 
many outcomes such as mortality (Carpenter and Dobkin 2009), crime (Carpenter and 
Dobkin 2015), college performance (Carrell, Hoekstra, and West 2011), marijuana use 
(Yörük and Yörük 2011; Crost and Guerrero 2012; Crost and Rees 2013; Yörük and Yörük 
2013), psychological wellbeing (Ertan Yörük and Yörük 2012), and risky sexual behavior 
(Ertan Yörük and Yörük 2015). The underlying identification assumption of this research 
design is that all of the determinants of the likelihood of contracting sexually transmitted 
infections, except for legal access to alcohol, trend smoothly at the age 21 cutoff. This is 
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a reasonable assumption because, other than legal alcohol access, there is no reason to 
expect any other determinant of STDs to change discontinuously on exactly the 21st 
birthday of an individual. Also, individuals do not have an incentive to misreport their 
date of birth when they are diagnosed with an STD. That is, manipulation around the age 
21 cutoff in the STD data should not be an issue.14  
This identification strategy has two main caveats. First, this approach identifies effects 
for men around the age of 21 years. This group is of special interest given the high rate of 
STDs among the age group of 20 to 24, but it is unclear whether findings of this study can 
be extrapolated to men of other ages. Second, although I expect the first-order effect of 
legal access to be through the increase in drinking, it is possible that changes in social 
environment (e.g., increased time spent at bars) at the MLDA have their own effect on the 
likelihood of contracting an STD. In essence, this approach identifies the reduced-form 
impact of the MLDA on STDs. 
2.4 Effect of the MLDA on Drinking 
With the data from the CDPH, I am unable to directly test for the effect of the MLDA 
on drinking. However, researchers have consistently shown that alcohol consumption 
increases on both the intensive and extensive margins at age 21. Carpenter and Dobkin 
(2009) use data from the National Health Interview Survey from 1997-2005 and estimate 
a 11 percent increase in drinking participation (the probability of having had a drink in the 
                                                 
14 The threat to identification comes from the possibility that certain types of individuals would misreport 
their age when they are diagnosed with gonorrhea, but this is very unlikely. It is possible that individuals 
misreport their age to gain access to alcohol before turning 21, but this simply implies a first stage that is 
smaller than 100 percent. 
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past year) at age 21. They also find a 21 percent increase in drinking frequency measured 
by the proportion of drinking days. Yörük and Yörük (2011) use data on individuals aged 
19 to 22 from the confidential versions of the NLSY1997 and estimate smaller increases 
in drinking at the MLDA. The probability of drinking in the past month jumped 6 percent, 
and respondents who were over 21 reported to drink on 1.5 more days in the previous 
month than those who were not. Carpenter and Dobkin (2015) use confidential versions 
of the 2001, 2003, and 2005 waves of the California Health Interview Survey (CHIS) and 
find a 31 percent increase in the probability of drinking in the month prior to the survey.15 
Drinking frequency is also found to increase; respondents just over 21 reportedly drank 
on 57 percent more days in the prior month than those just under 21. However, the increase 
in the likelihood of binge drinking, defined as the consumption of five or more drinks in 
one sitting, at age 21 is not statistically significant. The estimates of the first stage from 
the CHIS data are particularly applicable to this paper as the alcohol consumption data are 
from California and the timing of the surveys falls within the period of this study.  
A potential concern with these findings is that survey respondents under age 21 under-
report drinking because underage drinking is illegal. However, in the CHIS data, 
Carpenter and Dobkin (2015) do not find the responses of underage individuals to alcohol 
related questions to be systematically missing. Additionally, they use data from arrest 
records to show that there are large and significant increases in many alcohol related 
                                                 
15 The first stage results are presented in the appendix of Carpenter and Dobkin (2015). These percent 
changes have been calculated using the reported point estimates and the levels of the variable just before 
age 21. 
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crimes such as driving under the influence and drunkenness at age 21, which are not 
subject to such desirability bias. 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Effect of the MLDA on STDs 
First, I examine the change in the incidence of gonorrhea at the MLDA graphically. 
Figure A.1 presents the plot of local averages of the number of men diagnosed with 
gonorrhea in 30-day blocks of age. The fitted lines are quadratic fits of the o of gonorrhea 
cases by exact age in days on either side of age 21. The count of STD cases trends 
smoothly across the age 21 cutoff with no visible discontinuity.  
I formally estimate the discontinuity using equation 1.2 and do not find any discrete 
increase in the count of STDs at the MLDA. I test for the robustness of the results to 
excluding individuals who are diagnosed within the two weeks after their 21st birthday. 
The results are presented in Table A.3. Panel A shows estimates from log-linear 
regressions where the dependent variable is the log of the count of STDs by age in days. 
Panel B shows estimates from the corresponding negative binomial regressions. Estimates 
are presented in the decreasing order of bandwidth (lengths of age on either side of 21 
years included in the regression), ranging from 48 to 6 months. Different age polynomials 
are included in regressions with different bandwidths allowing for the most suitable fits. I 
control for cubic functions of age on both sides of the cutoff for the 48 and 36 month 
bandwidths, quadratic for the 24 month, and linear for the 12 and 6 month bandwidths. 
Results in columns 2, 4, and 6 have the same specifications as those in columns 1, 3, and 
5, but exclude the cases diagnosed within zero to fourteen days after the 21st birthday of 
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the individual. This is to ensure that the measurement error in the estimated age at 
contraction is not driving the results in the full sample. 
The results are consistent across all specifications and log-linear and negative binomial 
models. None of them provide evidence of an increase in STDs at the MLDA. All of the 
point estimates of discontinuity are negative and are statistically indistinguishable from 
zero even at the 10% level. Importantly, estimates are sufficiently precise to rule out 
meaningful increases in gonorrhea. For instance, in my preferred specification of the 
negative binomial model with the 48-month bandwidth and controls for cubic function of 
age, the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval (given a two-sided test) of the effect 
of legal access on gonorrhea rates in men is 1.6 percent. 
2.5.2 Effect of the MLDA on STDs in Racial and Geographic Subgroups 
While the results above suggest that the MLDA and the associated increase in drinking 
do not result in an increase in STDs on the whole, there may be differential effects on 
more narrowly defined sexual networks. Factors such as race (due to assortative mating) 
and geographic area (by the proximity of potential mates) are important determinants of 
an individual’s sexual network. Firstly, research suggests that asymptomatic gonorrhea 
may be more common in white men than black men (Crawford et al. 1977).16 Since the 
research design hinges on the infection being diagnosed within a short period after 
exposure, it is important to study the effects within individual racial groups. Secondly, 
infection rates are markedly different across different counties in California. In counties 
                                                 
16 The strain of the bacteria causing asymptomatic gonorrhea was found to be more common among white 
men and less common among black men. 
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with very low infection rates, the probability of having a sexual encounter with an infected 
person might be so low that despite a change in risky sexual behavior, no discernible 
change might occur in STD rates. Given these differences across subgroups, I estimate the 
discontinuity in gonorrhea rates at age 21 within racial and county subgroups allowing for 
possible heterogeneous effects. The data include a breakdown by race (whites, blacks, and 
Hispanics) and county groups based on gonorrhea infection rates (3 groups: top 3, top 4 
to 10, and the rest of the counties). 
Results indicate that there is no effect of increased drinking at the MLDA on gonorrhea 
rates for men in any of these subgroups. Figure A.2 presents the graphical evidence where 
the counts of gonorrhea by exact age in days are plotted separately for whites, blacks, and 
Hispanics. Similarly, Figure A.3 presents the plot of gonorrhea counts by age in groups of 
counties with different infection rates. The counts are found to trend smoothly across the 
age 21 cutoff, and the visual evidence indicates a zero-effect of the MLDA on STDs within 
each of the racial and geographic subgroups. 
I estimate the discontinuity within each group using equation 1.2. Results for whites, 
blacks, and Hispanics are shown in Panels A, B, and C of Table A.4. Results for the top 3 
and the top 4 to 10 counties by infection rate, and for the rest of the counties are in Panels 
A, B, and C of Table A.5. In both tables, estimates are from negative binomial regressions, 
and they are presented in the decreasing order of bandwidth from 48 to 6 months with 
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controls for different polynomials of age.17 As in the case of the entire population, there is 
no evidence of an increase in the incidence of STDs at the MLDA in any of the subgroups. 
In both Tables A.4 and A.5, all the estimates of the discontinuity across different 
subgroups and bandwidth specifications are statistically indistinguishable from zero even 
at the 10% level.  
In summary, I find little evidence of an increase in STDs across any of the different 
sexual networks defined by either race or geography. Importantly, I find no effects for 
black men for whom the infection is more likely to be symptomatic and infection rates are 
as high as 12.8 per thousand. Also, I find no effects even within the three counties with 
the highest infection rates (ranging from 3 to 8 cases per thousand). These results suggest 
that the lack of an effect of the MLDA on STDs in the overall population is not a 
consequence of averaging across groups for whom there are opposing effects, but rather 
that the MLDA and the associated increase in drinking do not cause increases in STD rates 
in any population.    
2.6 Conclusion 
This paper evaluates the effect of the minimum legal drinking age and the 
corresponding increase in drinking on sexually transmitted diseases. Effects are identified 
by exploiting the sudden change in legal access to alcohol at age 21 in a regression 
discontinuity model. Specifically, with administrative data from the California 
                                                 
17 When the data are broken down by race and county groups, the count of STDs is zero for some of the ages 
(in days). Hence, I prefer the negative binomial model. I also estimated the log-linear models using the same 
workaround as Carpenter and Dobkin (2009), where the dependent variable was calculated as log(STD count 
for the particular race + 0.5). The results from both models are qualitatively similar. 
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Department of Public Health, I compare counts of gonorrhea cases in men (aggregated by 
the exact age in days) diagnosed just before age 21 to that just after. Since gonorrhea in 
men is mostly diagnosed within fourteen days after exposure, any changes in the 
gonorrhea infection rates around the age 21 cutoff should result in changes in gonorrhea 
diagnosis rates within two weeks of that cutoff. 
Although the increase in drinking at the MLDA, along with increases in arrests for 
driving under the influence, drunkenness, and nuisance crimes, has been previously 
documented (Carpenter and Dobkin 2009; Carpenter and Dobkin 2011; Carpenter and 
Dobkin 2015; Yörük and Yörük 2011), the results of this paper indicate that the MLDA 
and the associated increase in drinking do not result in an increase in sexually transmitted 
diseases as measured by gonorrhea infections in men. This is true not only in the overall 
population but also in racial and geographic subgroups expected to be most at risk of 
contracting gonorrhea.   
The results of this paper differ from those in earlier work that study the relationship 
between drinking and STD rates. For instance, Carpenter (2005) studies the effects of 
“Zero Tolerance” drunk driving laws and finds that the adoption of such a law by a state 
significantly reduced gonorrhea rates among 15–19-year-old white males. Many factors 
could explain these differences. To the extent that 21 year-olds might have greater sexual 
awareness and greater access to birth control than teenagers, 21 year-olds might be less 
likely to engage in unprotected sex overall. In addition, the nature of the reduction in 
drinking that occurs as a result of Zero Tolerance laws might be different from the nature 
of the increase in drinking that results from gaining legal access to alcohol at the MLDA.  
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These results are important to public policy in two ways. Firstly, sexually transmitted 
diseases are an important health concern generally, and especially among young men aged 
20 to 24, the age group with the highest gonorrhea infection rate. As a result, it is important 
to understand the influence of different factors such as alcohol in causing the spread of 
these infections. This study’s findings suggest that targeting alcohol use may not be a 
particularly effective way of reducing STD infection rates. Secondly, the MLDA is an 
important policy instrument used to influence alcohol consumption among young adults, 
and it is important to understand its effects on different outcomes. While the increase in 
drinking at the MLDA of 21 years has been shown to have negative effects on various 
outcomes such as mortality, crime, and college performance (Carpenter and Dobkin 2009; 
Carrell, Hoekstra, and West 2011; Carpenter and Dobkin 2015), the results of this study 
indicate that it does not lead to an increase in sexually transmitted diseases. 
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3. HOUSING VOUCHERS, INCOME SHOCKS, AND CRIME: EVIDENCE 
FROM A LOTTERY  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The U.S. government provided $16.6 billion in rent subsidies to disadvantaged 
families through the Housing Choice Voucher Program in 2013 (Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities 2014). Historically, the U.S. government provided housing directly to 
families in the form of housing projects, though there has been a shift in the last few 
decades toward housing voucher programs. The federally-funded Housing Choice 
Voucher Program provides rent support to about 2.1 million households living in non-
government housing, which is around 43% of all households receiving federal rental 
assistance (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2012; 2013). The program, often simply 
called “Section 8,” is designed to allow participants to reside in areas otherwise 
unaffordable and provide an in-kind transfer to low-income families and individuals. The 
program is means-tested, and participating families receive a rent subsidy that is paid 
directly to their landlords.  
In this paper, we examine the effect of Section 8 vouchers on crime. Vouchers could 
affect crime through two major channels: income transfer effects and neighborhood 
effects. Income transfers can relieve financial pressures that could otherwise cause 
recipients to seek illicit income. Alternatively, income transfers could also provide the 
funds or leisure time necessary to participate in illegal activities. Voucher receipt could 
also affect criminal involvement by changing neighborhood influences. Moving to a better 
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neighborhood could reduce crime via positive peer effects or social norms, or it could 
increase crime by providing easier and wealthier targets.  
Understanding the causal effects of housing mobility programs is challenging because 
individuals select to participate in these programs. Eligible families that opt to use 
vouchers may also take other steps to better their lives, creating a substantial source of 
selection bias. Many studies of voucher programs rely on randomized social experiments, 
such as the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment. Often, Section 8 housing vouchers 
are given out via randomized lottery because it is not an entitlement program and there are 
usually more applicants than vouchers. This random variation in voucher allocation has 
been relied upon for identification of effects on a host of juvenile outcomes (Jacob, 
Kapustin, and Ludwig 2015; Jacob, Ludwig, and Miller 2013) as well as adult labor 
market outcomes.18 
In this paper, we exploit the exogenous variation in randomized wait-list positions 
assigned using a lottery in order to identify the causal effects of Section 8 vouchers on 
arrests of adult household heads. The lottery we study was administered by the Houston 
Housing Authority (HHA). We link the voucher recipients to arrest records from the 
Houston Police Department (HPD) to determine whether voucher receipt has an effect on 
arrests for various types of crimes. We estimate the effects using intent-to-treat models 
                                                 
18 Others have used the Gautreaux Program (a precursor of MTO) (Popkin, Rosenbaum, and Meaden 1993), 
random assignment into public housing (Oreopoulos 2003), or Hurricane Katrina (Hussey, Nikolsko-
Rzhevskyy, and Pacurar 2011) to study mobility and crime.  
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identified using the timing of voucher receipt, which is determined by the randomized 
lottery.  
To support the assumption that wait-list positions are indeed random and that there are 
no differences between those who lease-up with a voucher (i.e. use a voucher to pay their 
rent) earlier and those who lease-up later, we perform empirical tests for differences in 
pre-lottery characteristics of voucher recipients. The relationships between pre-lottery 
characteristics and wait-list positions are consistent with wait-list randomization, and the 
types of individuals who lease-up at different times are no different.  
Results indicate that some criminal activities actually increase while others remain 
unchanged due to voucher receipt. We find that the probability of being arrested for a 
violent offense in a quarter increases by 0.068 percentage points (a 97% increase). Our 
results highlight an unintended consequence of the Section 8 Housing Voucher Program 
– an increase in arrests for violent crime.  
We attribute this increase to the additional disposable income and leisure time 
available to voucher recipients that can be used to commit crimes; both of these 
mechanisms have been shown to increase illegal activity previously (Dobkin and Puller 
2007; Riddell and Riddell 2006; Foley 2011; Lin 2008). These effects may be stronger for 
groups of recipients more susceptible to crime, and we find that the effects are driven by 
recipients who had been arrested in the past and by males.  
Our contribution to the literature is three-fold. The primary contribution is that we are 
the first to consider the effect of housing vouchers on criminal outcomes for adult 
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recipients using a randomized lottery.19 We join an extensive crime literature produced by 
MTO, which, with the exception of Ludwig and Kling (2007) who studied the contagion 
effects of neighborhood crime on both adults and juveniles, primarily focuses on outcomes 
for youth whose families received vouchers. While most of these studies have found that 
MTO caused positive or neutral effects for female youth, their findings for male youth 
have been surprisingly negative (Clampet-Lundquist et al. 2011; Kling, Ludwig, and Katz 
2005; Sciandra et al. 2013; Zuberi 2012). The exception is Katz, Kling, and Liebman 
(2001), who show that male youth have less behavior problems after their families 
received vouchers through MTO.  
The effect of Section 8 voucher receipt on adult criminal outcomes is yet to be 
documented although Jacob, Kapustin, and Ludwig (2015) use a lottery-based 
identification strategy to show that there is no substantial effect on arrest rates of juveniles 
whose families received vouchers (among other outcomes). 
Secondly, we study the impact of residential mobility in the context of the Section 8 
voucher program which accounts for a significant portion of federal housing assistance 
(43% according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2013). Hence, our results 
are relevant for a large fraction of US housing aid. Again, we are the first to consider the 
effects of Section 8 voucher receipt on adult criminal outcomes using a lottery, so the 
policy implications of our results are significant. 
                                                 
19 Leech (2013) uses NLSY data to study the relationship between voucher receipt and self-reported violent 
altercations for young adult heads of household receiving vouchers. She suggests that selection bias is a 
methodological shortcoming of her study. She finds that voucher receipt is associated with reduced violent 
altercations, but that this association is not present in the subsample of black recipients.  
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Finally, our results speak to the relative impacts of the neighborhood and income 
effects that arise due to voucher receipt. We provide new evidence that the neighborhoods 
into which recipients move are only slightly different from their pre-voucher 
neighborhoods in demographic and economic characteristics. This result is in agreement 
with existing literature on Section 8 vouchers (Jacob and Ludwig 2012; Lens 2013) and 
suggests that the effect of the income transfers maybe be the larger influence. We also 
believe that income transfer effects dominate because the increase in arrests that we detect 
is in line with the negative outcomes found in the previous literature on government cash 
transfer programs (Dobkin and Puller 2007; Kenkel, Schmeiser, and Urban 2014; Riddell 
and Riddell 2006; Evans and Moore 2011; Foley 2011). 
Additional income can also affect crime by altering recipients’ employment decisions 
in that it may afford recipients the opportunity to take additional leisure time, which they 
could use to participate in crime, among other things. Empirically, Section 8 voucher 
receipt does, in fact, cause lower labor force participation rates and earnings (Jacob and 
Ludwig 2012; Carlson et al. 2012), and a similar effect has been detected for Food Stamps 
(Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2012). 
Overall, our study documents an unintended consequence of Section 8 housing 
vouchers (an increase in arrests for violent crime). The program is the largest housing 
assistance program in the U.S., so this repercussion could be quite large on a national 
scale. The disparity across subgroups implies that large income shocks have 
heterogeneous effects on recipients and has policy implications for screening and 
oversight within the voucher program. 
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3.2 Background 
The Section 8 Housing Voucher Program is the largest housing assistance program in 
the U.S. The vouchers are federally-funded, and the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) allocates the funds to local housing authorities and sets 
eligibility standards across the nation. HUD requires that participants’ incomes fall below 
80% of the median family income in the area, adjusting for family size, and stipulates that 
75% of new voucher recipients’ incomes are less than 30% of the local median family 
income (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2013). Voucher recipients must also be 
citizens or of other eligible immigration status, and local housing authorities can deny 
eligibility for a history of criminal activity (HUD 2001; HHA 2013). Local housing 
authorities submit the subsidies directly to the recipients’ new landlords. Continued 
eligibility is assessed annually, and recipients are allowed to use their vouchers in any U.S. 
city with the Housing Choice Voucher Program in place, although, according to HHA, 
less than 10% of their voucher recipients move to a different city. 
The Houston Housing Authority (HHA) serves around 60,000 Houstonians, over 80% 
of whom are participants in the Housing Choice Voucher Program. HHA accepted 
voucher applications from December 11, 2006, to December 27, 2006, and received over 
29,000 applications. All applicants were assigned a lottery number regardless of whether 
they met the eligibility criteria. Vouchers were then extended to the applicants as the 
funding became available starting with the lowest lottery numbers. The lottery and 
voucher service processes are outlined in Figure B.1. Once an applicant’s wait-list position 
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was reached, he or she received a voucher screening packet from HHA and the verification 
process began. After their eligibility was verified, families were required to sign a lease in 
a Section 8 approved community in order to participate in the program. The average time 
between HHA sending the initial packet and the recipient leasing up with the voucher was 
6 months. Because the speed of this process varied by applicant, the vouchers were not 
issued in perfect sequential order.20  
The first vouchers were issued in July 2007. However, the majority of vouchers were 
serviced starting in 2009, and HHA had sent screening packets to almost all the lottery 
numbers by October 2012. Overall, the take-up rate was about 23%. The low take up is a 
result of applicants dropping out at every step of the voucher service process. Based on 
the last known application statuses, close to 60% of the verification packets were not 
returned to HHA by the families. 2.5% of the applicants were found to be ineligible after 
verification and about 4% of them were unable to sign a lease in time, and the voucher 
expired. 
We geocode the addresses provided on the applications and the addresses of current 
residents (in 2014, when the data were obtained) in order to describe the pre- and post-
lottery neighborhoods of voucher recipients. Figure B.2 shows the density of these two 
types of addresses across the city using heat maps and contains the boundaries of HPD’s 
                                                 
20 In addition, some lottery numbers were called too far out of order for this to be the case. HHA says that 
there were no priority groups in the lottery, and there are no common characteristics of these applicants who 
were called out of sequence. However, because we use the assigned lottery number to predict voucher 
service, our estimates should not be biased by the occasional non-sequential servicing of lottery numbers. 
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police beats.21 The distribution of addresses indicates that the voucher-users are not 
moving to different parts of the city on the whole.  
Changes in neighborhood (defined as Census Tract and police division) experienced 
by the voucher recipients are documented in Table B.1. Around 14% of voucher recipients 
did not move and instead used the voucher at their address at the time of application; nearly 
30% stayed in the same Census Tract. The median distance moved is 3.01 miles, and the 
voucher paid an average of $628 toward rent every month. Only 3.4% of these recipients 
were living in public housing at the time of application. Differences between the 
neighborhoods before and after the lottery are described in Panel B. We report median 
rent in 2012 from the American Community Survey, and we see that voucher recipients 
lease-up in census tracts with only $39 higher monthly median rent. We report 
demographics and socioeconomic characteristics of the census tracts from the 2010 census 
and crime rates from 2000 to 2005 for the police divisions. The post-lottery neighborhoods 
are somewhat better off in terms of quality parameters such as unemployment rate, 
household income, poverty rate and crime rates.  
These differences in neighborhoods are minimal; for example, voucher-use 
neighborhoods had on average 2.1 less crimes per year per 1000 residents than application 
neighborhoods, which is a 1.5% improvement. As a result, we believe that any impact of 
the vouchers in this context can be most reasonably attributed to the income shock induced 
by an annual rent subsidy of more than $7,500 on average. Moreover, if we assume that 
                                                 
21 The heat maps are created in ArcMap using a point density operation that creates a grid over the map and 
then counts the number of address points within each grid cell. 
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voucher recipients were paying the median rent in their Census Tracts of residence before 
voucher receipt ($797), because they contribute on average $205 to rent once they receive 
a voucher, they are paying $592 less on housing per month.22 To voucher recipients, these 
newly-available funds are no different in effect from a direct cash transfer. Conversely, 
the difference in the average median rent between pre- and post-voucher Census Tracts is 
only $39, indicating that the majority of the voucher does not go towards improved 
housing but instead impacts recipients like a cash transfer. 
Additional income can be spent on things that can increase or decrease the likelihood 
of arrest. It could also alleviate financial pressures, which would reduce the recipients’ 
motivations to be involved in crime that can lead to financial gain, such as selling illegal 
drugs or theft. The net effect is ambiguous, and the question will ultimately have to be 
answered empirically. The theoretical implications of an in-kind transfer on labor 
decisions are similarly ambiguous because they depend on the shape of each recipient’s 
indifference curves. However, researchers find that vouchers reduce earnings and labor 
force participation (Jacob and Ludwig 2012). Like additional income, additional leisure 
time can be put toward things that either increase or decrease the likelihood of arrest. 
Given that much of the existing literature has examined MTO, it is important to 
highlight the differences between MTO and the housing voucher program. MTO 
researchers recruited only public housing residents to participate and split them into three 
groups. The first (the “MTO experimental group”) received vouchers and was only 
                                                 
22 We consider this estimate to be an upper bound of the effective cash transfer because voucher recipients 
may have paid rents below the median rents in their Census Tracts before receiving a voucher.  
 30 
 
allowed to use them in Census Tracts with low poverty rates. The second group was simply 
given vouchers that could be used anywhere without restrictions. This group was called 
the “Section 8 experimental group” because their treatment was similar to Section 8. The 
third was a control. The neighborhoods into which MTO experimental families moved 
were notably different from the ones that they left (Katz, Kling, and Liebman 2001; Kling, 
Ludwig, and Katz 2005). The MTO Section 8 experimental group moved to areas more 
like their neighborhoods of origin than the MTO experimental group (Kling, Ludwig, and 
Katz 2005), although there was some improvement. Similar to findings for the MTO 
Section 8 group and Jacob and Ludwig’s findings (2012), we find that Census Tract 
characteristics of new neighborhoods are slightly improved, but the changes are not large. 
Additionally, the neighborhood changes we detect are smaller in relative terms than those 
found in MTO studies for the MTO experimental group. For example, HHA voucher 
recipients moved to Census Tracts with a 7.5% lower average poverty rate, while MTO 
experimental group participants moved to census tracts with a 27% lower average poverty 
rate (Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007). 
MTO’s driving mechanisms were also different because it targeted families living in 
public housing, and therefore already receiving housing assistance. MTO required the 
families to move and provided little, if any, additional financial gains to them. Section 8, 
on the other hand, provides a substantial income transfer, and HUD does not allow local 
housing authorities to place restrictions on neighborhoods in which recipients can use 
vouchers. While we don’t have information on the Section 8 participants’ reasons for 
applying for the program, it is well documented that MTO families cite a desire to get 
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away from gangs and drugs as the main reason for volunteering (e.g. Kling, Ludwig, and 
Katz 2005). This concern is likely addressed by the neighborhood change facilitated by 
MTO, but Section 8 voucher receipt may have little effect on this. The populations opting 
into these two programs are also likely to be quite different due to incongruous 
motivations. 
3.3 Data 
The Houston Housing Authority provided us with information on the voucher 
applicants. These confidential data include lottery numbers, the number of bedrooms 
needed (calculated based on family size), the date on which HHA sent the voucher 
screening packet, and the move-in date for voucher recipients. The data also include name 
and birthdate, which we use to match the HHA data to arrest records. They also provided 
additional, more detailed information on the set of applicants who were participants in the 
Housing Choice Voucher Program in 2014. For this group, we also know their race and 
homeless status at the time of admission, as well as their voucher-use address.  
HHA assigned lottery numbers up to 29,327, but we limit our sample to those living 
in Houston at the time of the lottery. Additionally, there are a small number of duplicate 
applicants; we assign them their lowest lottery number. We also drop applicants with 
lottery numbers over 24,000 because the take up rate is much lower among the later lottery 
numbers indicating a probable change in the voucher service process after that point.  
Additionally, we restrict our analysis to those applicants who eventually leased-up 
with a voucher. Estimates from the sample unconditional on take-up are of similar 
magnitudes as those from the sample conditional on take-up, but are measured imprecisely 
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given the relatively low take-up rates in Houston. The take-up rate is only 23%, which is 
low relative to the 69% national average estimated by Finkel, Pistilli, and Buron (2001). 
We also perform empirical tests, detailed in the following section, to support the 
assumption that the population of takers with low lottery numbers is no different from the 
takers with high lottery numbers. The resulting sample size is 4,510.  
Table B.2 reports pre-lottery descriptive statistics. We report them for the population 
of voucher-users, and we show them separately by low and high lottery numbers 
(applicants with lottery numbers below and above the median) to demonstrate the 
similarity between applicants (prior to the lottery) whose vouchers were serviced early 
and those whose vouchers were serviced later. If these groups are different on important 
measures, it could indicate that HHA gave preference to some groups in lottery number 
assignment or that the type of individual who leased-up with a voucher changed over time. 
The first panel of Table B.2 pertains to the lottery implementation. The means of 
lottery numbers in the two groups differ by about 11,000. In the analysis that follows, 
treatment is leasing-up using a voucher. Intuitively, the “voucher service” quarter (intent-
to-treat) is the quarter during which the applicant would have leased-up according to 
lottery number. On average, recipients take approximately 6 months to complete the 
screening process and actually relocate using the voucher. We determine whether the 
individual has been sent a screening packet by a given quarter based on his or her lottery 
number relative to the numbers called by that point.23 Lagging this by two quarters gives 
                                                 
23 Since the lottery numbers were not called in perfect sequential order, we cannot identify the range of 
lottery numbers simply using the smallest and largest lottery number called in a quarter. Additionally, for 
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us the “voucher service” quarter. The low lottery numbers were serviced about 1.5 years 
(5.8 quarters) before the high lottery numbers on average.  
The average voucher recipient was around 35 years old at the time of the lottery and 
required just over two bedrooms (indicating that the average family size was between 2 
and 6, Housing Choice Voucher Program Guidebook (2001). Around 94% of recipients 
are black, and using 2012 voting records from the Harris County Tax Assessor’s office, 
we estimate that nearly 90% of applicants are female.24 Less than 1% of recipients were 
homeless at the time of admission to the program. The number of observations varies for 
race and homeless status because they are only available for current (2014) HHA voucher 
recipients. There is only one statistically significant difference between the high and low 
lottery numbers on any of these measures (number of bedrooms required), and it is not 
economically significant. 
We match the HHA data to arrest records provided by the Houston Police Department 
(HPD). The arrest records are reported at the time of booking and include information on 
the offense as well as the arrestee’s name, birthdate and reported home address. We match 
the HHA and HPD data using name and birthdate, and we perform secondary matches 
                                                 
approximately 5,000 applicants, there is no recorded screening packet issue date. As a workaround, within 
each quarter from 2007 to 2011, we take the lottery number at the 75th percentile of the numbers called in 
that quarter to be the last number called in that quarter. We assign the next lottery number as the first number 
called in the subsequent quarter. 
24 We calculate the percentage of Harris County voters whose reported gender is “male” for each unique 
first name in the list of registered voters. If there are at least 5 individuals with a given name, and 70% or 
more are listed as males, the name is assigned the gender “male.” If 30% or less are listed as male, we 
classify the name as “female.” Applicants with unmatched or ambiguous names are omitted from the gender 
subgroup analysis. 
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using the Levenshtein distance and soundex code of each name for unmatched records.25 
The arrest records range from January 1990 to November 2011.26 We also use the matched 
arrest records to create measures of criminal activity in the period before the lottery and a 
quarterly panel of arrests for the study period after the program commenced (from quarter 
1 of 2007 to quarter 3 of 2011).  
We consider arrests of any type and specifically categorize violent offenses, drug 
offenses and financially-motivated offenses. We measure arrests as a binary indicator for 
whether the recipient was arrested. The pre-lottery crime measures are constructed for the 
5 years prior to the lottery, and we create an additional binary indicator for whether the 
applicant was arrested at least once between 1990 and 2006. Around 20% of applicants 
were arrested during that 16 year period, and approximately 9% of applicants had been 
arrested in the 5 years prior to the lottery.27 There are no statistically significant differences 
between high and low lottery number individuals.  
Using the geocoded application addresses, we find that voucher recipients lived in 
Census Tracts with around 51% black residents, and around 36% Hispanic residents. The 
mean unemployment rate was around 12% and the mean of median family income was 
approximately $34,000. The mean poverty rate was quite high at over 30%. Voucher 
                                                 
25 For the arrest records that are unmatched by name and birthdate, we calculate the Levenshtein distance 
for the first and last names, if the sum of the Levenshtein distances is less than 3, conditional on an exact 
birthdate match, we accept the match. For the records that are still unmatched, we perform an exact soundex 
code match.  
26 The Houston Police Department has denied our requests for additional data, so we are not able to extend 
the panel further into the post-lottery period.  
27 HHA performs criminal background checks on all adult family members to ensure that they have “no 
drug-related or violent criminal history during the past 5 years” (p. 18, HHA 2013). HHA obtains conviction 
records, so any potential leasers who were arrested but not convicted would be eligible. 
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recipients with higher lottery numbers lived in census tracts with slightly higher 
unemployment rates and slightly lower poverty rates. Voucher recipients lived in police 
divisions with an annual average of 135 crimes per 1000 residents. On average, nearly 60 
of these crimes were property crimes and only 13 were violent. Recipients with higher 
lottery numbers lived in neighborhoods with 1.1 more crimes per year per 1000 residents, 
a marginal difference considering the average crime rate. Although some of these 
differences are statistically significant, none of them are economically significant. The 
similarity between these groups indicates that pre-lottery characteristics are distributed 
randomly across lottery numbers and suggests that the lottery was in fact random. 
In Table B.3, we report post-lottery descriptive statistics. The purpose of this table is 
to preview results in a cross-sectional manner. We show measures of program take-up 
(whether the individual’s voucher has been serviced and whether he or she has leased-up 
by a quarter) as well as all of the arrest outcomes averaged over person-quarters (from 
quarter 1 of 2010 to quarter 3 of 2011). Statistics are restricted to last 7 quarters of the 
panel, when vouchers of individuals with low lottery numbers had mostly been serviced, 
but individuals with high lottery numbers had not had their vouchers serviced. 
Specifically, vouchers of individuals with lottery numbers below the median had been 
serviced, on average, for 89% of person-quarters. Conversely, the vouchers of those with 
lottery numbers above the median had been serviced for around 17% of person-quarters 
during this period. Lease-up follows a similar pattern where individuals with low lottery 
numbers are nearly 70 percentage points more likely to have leased up during a person-
quarter. The post-lottery statistics for the outcomes – probability of arrest in a person-
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quarter for different crime categories – indicate that recipients with low lottery numbers 
are considerably more likely to be arrested for crimes of any type and for violent crimes 
in this period.  
3.4 Identification and Methods 
In this study, we identify the effect of housing vouchers on criminal involvement using 
a lottery. The lottery randomized the order of the wait-list from which applicants were 
called for voucher service and, therefore, the order of actual voucher receipt. This 
randomization allows us to identify the causal effects of voucher receipt. Because the 
random variation we exploit for identification is in timing, we analyze criminal outcomes 
using a quarterly panel of arrests using pooled cross-sectional models. 
Because we consider the group of applicants who eventually lease-up with a voucher, 
our identifying assumption is that the timing of voucher receipt among those who 
eventually received the voucher was exogenous. That is, we assume that within the group 
of participants who lease-up using a voucher, the low lottery number individuals (who 
leased up earlier) had similar propensities to commit crime as those with higher lottery 
numbers (who leased up later). We condition on lease-up because the take-up rate is 
particularly low for this lottery, resulting in imprecise estimates for the entire sample. 
Take-up rates are consistent across time, which we will show in Section 5. For this reason, 
we believe that the leasers with low and high lottery numbers are no different, and we 
show results from additional empirical tests to support this in the following section.  
Before we estimate intent-to-treat effects of the vouchers, we first examine evidence 
on whether the randomization was properly implemented and whether the leasers with low 
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lottery numbers are different from those with high lottery numbers. We test this 
empirically by examining the extent to which demographic and criminal history variables 
are correlated with lottery number or voucher service quarter. We represent this 
graphically by simply plotting these characteristics against lottery number and estimate it 
empirically according to the following equation: 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖     (2.1) 
In the above equation, voucher orderi is either the randomized lottery number assigned 
to applicant i or his/her voucher service quarter (where the first quarter of 2007 is indexed 
to one). We test each applicant’s age at the time of lottery, number of bedrooms, and the 
set of criminal history variables: whether (and how many times) the applicant was arrested 
in the 5 years prior for any type of offense, a violent offense, a drug offense, or a 
financially-motivated offense, and whether the applicant was ever arrested between 1990 
and 2006. We also look for correlations in race and homelessness status at time of 
admission (for 2014 residents), neighborhood characteristics prior to the lottery (for the 
applicants whose addresses were geocoded successfully), and gender (for those whose 
gender we could impute from their first name as described in Section 3). 
To estimate the impact of Section 8 vouchers on arrests, we estimate the intent-to-treat 
effect of voucher service. We estimate regressions of the following form: 
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝜌 +  𝜋 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + Ψ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜙𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡     (2.2) 
where post voucher serviceit is a dummy variable equal to one if  individual i’s voucher 
has been serviced by quarter t. The results should be interpreted as the effects of potential 
voucher use based on lottery number, and can be reweighted by the first stage to recover 
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a local average treatment effect. To estimate this first stage, we use an indicator for 
whether individual i had leased up using a voucher by quarter t, called post lease-upit, as 
the outcome variable.  
We estimate the intent-to-treat effects using a number of arrest outcomes: whether an 
individual was arrested for crimes of any type, violent crimes, financially-motived crimes, 
and drug crimes in quarter t.  
We estimate all models using quarter fixed effects (φt) as well as robust standard errors 
that are clustered at the individual level. All specifications are estimated both with and 
without controls (Xi) for past crime (probability of arrest for the particular crime category 
in the 5 years prior to the lottery), age at the time of the lottery and a proxy for family size 
(number of bedrooms); this tests whether timing of voucher service is correlated with any 
of the observable characteristics.28 If specifications that do and do not include controls 
yield similar estimates, this can be interpreted as evidence that is consistent with 
randomization of timing of lease-up. We also replicate the main results using a negative 
binomial model to show that results are not sensitive to the parametric specification 
imposed by the linear probability model. 
 We take a cue from the existing mobility literature and explore the possibility of 
dynamic effects over time (Kling, Ludwig, and Katz 2005). Specifically, we estimate 
separate treatment effects for the first year after voucher service and later years of voucher 
service by using two binary treatment variables. The first is equal to one if the applicant’s 
                                                 
28 We perform additional analyses controlling for application address Census Tract characteristics and police 
division crime statistics in Table B.11 because they are not available for all recipients. 
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voucher had been serviced within the past year, and the second is equal to one if the 
applicant’s voucher had been serviced more than a year ago.  
In order to further explore potential mechanisms and policy implications, we replicate 
our main analysis for 2 pairs of subgroups. We compare results for recipients with and 
without past arrests because we believe that past arrests may signal a propensity for crime. 
We then separate out males and females because men have much higher arrest rates for 
violent crime than women.  
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Tests of Identifying Assumption 
Identification of the model comes from the assumption that the timing of voucher 
receipt among those who eventually received the voucher was exogenous. That is, we 
assume that within the population of leasers, individuals with lower lottery numbers had 
similar propensities to commit crime as those with higher lottery numbers. Because the 
timing of voucher packet issue and therefore subsequent transition into subsidized housing 
was determined by a randomized lottery, this is a reasonable assumption. Nevertheless, 
we test this assumption empirically in several ways.  
First, we test this by showing that take-up rates did not change over time. If the rate 
had changed as HHA serviced higher lottery numbers, it could indicate that within the 
population of leasers, those with high lottery numbers may be different from those with 
low lottery numbers. Figure B.3 plots take-up rates over lottery numbers. Take-up rates 
do not appear to change over the range of lottery numbers. We also test this empirically 
to determine whether there is a correlation between lottery number and take-up. We report 
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estimates of this correlation within the figure, and there is not a statistically significant 
relationship. 
Second, we test for correlations between observable characteristics and both lottery 
number and voucher service quarter. If the identifying assumption holds, we expect to see 
no correlations between these measures and demographic variables or criminal history 
measures. For example, if the most motivated applicants were assigned lower numbers 
through manipulation of the lottery mechanism, we would see a negative correlation 
between lottery number and indicators of stability such as age, gender, and criminal 
history. Alternatively, within the group of high lottery numbers, if only the most stable 
individuals lease-up (because they are more likely to stay at the same address for an 
extended period, thereby remaining reachable by HHA), we would see a positive 
correlation. 
Figure B.4 represents these relationships graphically for criminal history (probability 
of past arrests, past violent arrests, past drug arrests and past financial arrests) and 
demographic (age and number of bedrooms) variables. Each dot is a local average for a 
bin of 250 lottery numbers. If lottery number is truly random and the leaser population is 
constant over time in observable characteristics, the local averages should exhibit a flat 
relationship. This does appear to be the case, and we take this as support for the 
identification assumption. 
Table B.4 reports the results of the empirical tests. Column 1 contains the results from 
24 separate regressions using lottery number as the independent variable as described by 
equation 2.1. Similarly, the regressions that generated column 2 all use indexed voucher 
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service quarter as the independent variable. Each row is labeled for the covariate used as 
the dependent variable.  
There is only one statistically significant correlation between individual characteristics 
and voucher order. This effect is on the number of bedrooms, but it is not economically 
significant. It predicts that the individual with the highest lottery number (24,000) would 
require 0.11 more bedrooms than the individual with the lowest lottery number. There are 
no significant relationships between lottery number or voucher service quarter and 
criminal history measures (perhaps the most important determinants of future arrests).  
There are a few significant correlations between voucher order and neighborhood 
characteristics, but none of them are economically significant. The leasers with higher 
lottery numbers come from Census Tracts with higher unemployment rates and lower 
poverty rates. They also come from police divisions with higher crime rates overall and 
for violent crimes. Again, none of these differences are economically significant. For 
example, if we consider 2 applicants whose vouchers were serviced 2 years apart, we 
would expect the later-served applicant’s original neighborhood to only have 3.25 (2% of 
the mean) additional crimes per 1000 population annually. Importantly, because we find 
an increase in violent crime arrests for recipients, if we assume recipients from low crime 
neighborhoods have a lower propensity for crime, any indication that leasers with lower 
lottery numbers came from better neighborhoods would imply that our findings are a lower 
bound of the true increase. As an additional check, we also estimate the main models with 
and without these controls and show that the results are invariant, indicating that timing 
of voucher service is orthogonal to these characteristics. 
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3.5.2 Effect of Voucher Service on Lease-Up  
Before examining the effect of voucher receipt on criminal outcomes, we first 
document that the voucher recipients are likely to lease-up when we predict that their 
vouchers were serviced. Our ability to use lottery variation to identify effects hinges on 
the extent to which the lottery predicts lease-up.  
Table B.5 contains the first stage results obtained by estimating equation 2.2 using 
post lease-up as the outcome. The table reports the coefficient on post voucher service 
from 2 separate regressions. The results indicate that in 84.9% of the person-quarters after 
voucher service, the voucher recipient had previously leased-up. This coefficient is 
identical when we include controls in column 2, suggesting that controls are orthogonal to 
post voucher service. The large magnitude of the first stage results means that the intent-
to-treat estimates will be very close to the local average treatment effects.  
3.5.3 Effect of Voucher Service on Arrests  
Table B.6 contains the main results for the full sample of voucher recipients. We 
estimate equation 2.2 to measure the intent-to-treat using both ordinary least squares and 
a negative binomial model. We also report the mean of each outcome variable from the 
year preceding the lottery (2006) for the relevant population; we refer to it as the “pre-
lottery mean.” Each panel is labeled for the outcome variable for which the results are 
generated. We run models both with and without controls and demonstrate that our results 
are unresponsive to their inclusion, indicating that the timing of voucher service is 
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unrelated to these observable characteristics and, we expect, to the unobservable 
characteristics.29  
Results show no evidence that voucher service and lease-up affect arrests for all types 
of crimes combined. All of the coefficients are statistically insignificant. We also look at 
arrests for specific types of crimes that are likely to be affected by voucher receipt: violent 
crimes, drug crimes, and financially-motivated crimes. We find statistically significant 
effects on violent crimes. The magnitude of said effect indicates that voucher receipt 
increases quarterly probability of violent crime arrest by 0.068 percentage points. 
Comparing this estimate to the mean pre-lottery quarterly probability of violent crime 
arrest (from 2006), it represents a 97% increase. In absolute terms, these results suggest 
an increase of 2.7 violent crime arrests per 1000 recipients annually. The neighborhoods 
into which the recipients move have on average 13.2 reported violent crimes per 1000 
residents annually. If each reported violent crime results in one arrest on average, this 
increase may be associated with an approximately 21% increase in neighborhood crime. 
Negative binomial results for violent crime are similarly large and statistically 
significant. Results indicate around a 78% increase in violent crime arrests. We also find 
evidence that recipients are arrested for more violent crimes in the 6 months during which 
their eligibility verification and voucher process is underway but they have not yet leased-
up (Table B.10). This increase is the effect of an impending income shock and can be 
                                                 
29 Table B.6 contains models that include controls observed for the entire sample. We also rerun the main 
models adding neighborhood controls only available for a subset of recipients. Results are not statistically 
different from those here, the effect on violent crimes remains statistically significant (the coefficient is 
0.000693 compared to 0.000676) and coefficients change minimally between models with and without 
controls. Results are in Table B.11. 
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interpreted as an announcement effect. 
Drug crime arrests appear to be unaffected by voucher receipt. Effects are statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. Financially-motivated crime arrests also appear to be 
unaffected by voucher receipt. The coefficients are positive and large, but are not 
statistically distinguishable from zero. We attribute the lack of significance to limited 
statistical power given the small sample size.  
As discussed earlier, one might also expect differential effects by how long an 
individual has been treated (as Kling, Ludwig, and Katz 2005, found for juveniles). Table 
B.7 contains the results from models that allow for the effect of voucher service to vary 
over time. Specifically, we estimate effects of two different intent-to-treat measures: 
whether the applicant’s voucher was serviced within the last year, and whether the 
applicant’s voucher was serviced more than a year ago. Because the bulk of vouchers were 
serviced in 2009 or later and our panel ends in 2011, most applicants were treated for just 
over 2 years or less. Because ordinary least squares results and negative binomial results 
are so similar for the main results, we estimate these models using just ordinary least 
squares for simplicity. 
Panels A to D contain results from different crime categories. Similar to results 
reported previously, there is little evidence of an overall effect for all arrests, drug arrests 
and financially-motivated arrests. Violent arrests are slightly more responsive to voucher 
receipt during the first year of voucher use, although the coefficients for the first year and 
later years are not statistically different from each other. In summary, we find that voucher 
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receipt causes a rather large increase in violent crime arrests for recipients. We find that 
the vouchers have no effect on other types of crime.  
3.5.4 Subgroup Analysis  
There are a number of reasons to expect some types of individuals to respond 
differently to the vouchers. In this section, we test numerous hypotheses about the cause 
of this increase in violent arrests and narrow in on a plausible explanation.30 It is 
reasonable to postulate that if the voucher makes individuals more likely to commit a 
crime, those who have a higher propensity for crime will respond more strongly. We 
compare recipients who have been arrested in the past to those who have not because they 
have demonstrated such a propensity for crime. Then, we compare males to females 
because males are more likely to be arrested in general and in our sample. Additionally, 
MTO studies have consistently found asymmetric effects by gender (Katz, Kling, and 
Liebman 2001; Clampet-Lundquist et al. 2011; Jacob, Kapustin, and Ludwig 2015; 
Ludwig and Kling 2007; Kling, Ludwig, and Katz 2005; Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007). 
Table B.8 contains results for the subgroups. The first 2 columns compare results for 
recipients with (column 1) and without (column 2) any past arrests. As in the full sample, 
the result for violent crime is large and statistically significant, but only for the recipients 
with at least one past arrest. The effect represents an increase of nearly 70% compared to 
the pre-lottery mean for this subgroup. The coefficient for recipients without a previous 
                                                 
30 We test 2 other pairs of subgroups and include those results in Table B.13: younger vs. older recipients 
(under and over 30 years old) and “non-movers” (who use their voucher at their application addresses) vs. 
“movers.” There are no results of note for the age-related subgroups. Non-movers are more likely to be 
arrested for any type of crime than movers, but because the decision to move is endogenous, we are unable 
to disentangle the difference between being a non-mover “type” and the effects of not moving.  
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arrest is also positive, but it is small and not statistically significant. For the previously-
arrested sample, there is a sizable positive effect on financially-motivated arrests, but the 
coefficient is not statistically different from zero.  
In the second set of columns (3 and 4) we compare results by gender. We are only able 
to perform this analysis for recipients whose gender we could impute by their first name 
as described in Section 3, so the number of individuals is less than that used for the main 
analysis. We find that males are in fact more likely to be arrested for a violent crime than 
the females due to the voucher. The coefficient for violent crime for males is large, 
positive, and statistically significant, while that for females is small, negative and not 
statistically significant.   
If male-headed households are more likely to have multiple adults, voucher receipt 
could increase partner domestic violence either by changing the domestic balance of 
power in families or by allowing for increased consumption of alcohol and drugs. The 
arrest records from the Houston Police Department do not identify domestic violence as a 
particular type of offense, but because we observe both home and arrest addresses, we can 
consider violent crimes occurring at home as a proxy for reported domestic violence. Only 
14% of violent crimes committed by these males occur at home, so these offenses are not 
driving our results. 
3.5.5 Test for Attrition 
One potential concern for our study is attrition. That is, to the extent that individuals 
with low lottery numbers are more or less likely to move out of Houston than individuals 
with high numbers, our results could be biased. For example, if individuals who receive 
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high lottery numbers are more likely to leave Houston and commit crimes elsewhere that 
are not measured in our data, then our results could overstate the increase in violent crime 
due to housing vouchers.  
We empirically test whether applicants with lower lottery numbers and earlier voucher 
service quarters are more or less likely to have stayed in Houston than those with higher 
numbers and later voucher service quarters. We proxy for continued Houston residence 
with whether the applicant was registered to vote in the City of Houston in 2012 and 
whether he or she voted in the 2012 general election. Specifically, we estimate an analog 
of equation 2.1 used in the test of randomization, to test for a relationship between when 
an applicant’s voucher was serviced and whether he or she stayed in the city.  
We show the raw data in Figure B.5; it plots voter registration and actual voting in 
2012 against lottery numbers. Each dot represents a local average for a bin of about 250 
lottery numbers. There is no discernable correlation between lottery number and either 
voting outcome. This suggests that individuals whose numbers were called early in the 
sample period were no more or less likely to be in Houston several years later than those 
whose numbers were called late in the sample period.  
Table B.9 contains the results of the empirical test. In column 1 the dependent variable 
is a binary indicator for being registered in 2012, and in column 2 it is a binary indicator 
for voting in 2012. There are no significant correlations between when an applicant was 
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served by HHA (measured by lottery number and voucher service quarter) and the two 
proxies for Houston residence.31  
3.6 Conclusion 
In this study, we analyze whether receiving a housing voucher affects criminal activity 
of low income individuals. The timing of voucher receipt was determined by an 
individual’s position on the wait-list, which was assigned using a randomized lottery. We 
use the lottery numbers to determine by when an individual’s wait-list number was 
serviced and estimate intent-to-treat models to determine the effect on arrests.  
Results indicate that voucher receipt causes a large increase in violent crime arrests. 
Over 90% of these arrests are for assaults, and most of those are simple assaults resulting 
in no bodily injury. We find that if 1000 individuals receive vouchers, we can expect at 
least 2.7 additional violent crime arrests a year. HHA issued vouchers to 4510 individuals, 
so they should observe at least 12.2 additional arrests per year. Using an estimated social 
cost of $9,971 per assault (Lochner and Moretti 2004), the social cost of 12.2 additional 
assaults (the least costly and most common type of arrest in our dataset) is $120,938.21 
annually. To the extent that the arrests we observe are only a portion of the underlying 
crimes, this cost estimate is a lower bound. Nationally, there are 2.1 million Housing 
Choice Voucher recipients, so these effects could translate to 5,670 more arrests annually, 
costing over $56 million across the US. 
                                                 
31 Table B.12 contains an additional test. We replicate the main results using only the population who were 
registered to vote in 2012. Point estimates are 0.000647, compared to 0.000676 in Table B.6, but the 
coefficient is no longer statistically significant likely due to the reduced sample size.  
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Recently, long-run studies of the Moving to Opportunity Experiment as well as 
random moves precipitated by public housing demolitions have emphasized the positive 
later life impacts of moving to better neighborhoods for children (Chetty, Hendren, and 
Katz 2016). Although the Housing Choice Voucher Program was designed to facilitate 
such mobility in addition to providing an in-kind transfer to low-income individuals, our 
results indicate that the transfer may be the more dominant effect and could be leading to 
this increase in violent crime arrests. We show that the neighborhoods into which 
recipients move are only slightly less disadvantaged than their original neighborhoods, 
which is consistent with previous research (Lens 2013). We also calculate that the 
effective cash transfer experienced by the recipients is nearly $600 per month based on 
the difference between an estimate of their pre-voucher rent expenditures and their actual 
post-voucher rent contributions.  
Based on the relative size of neighborhood and income effects, we believe that 
individuals in our sample may be spending the extra income on things that lead to violent 
crime such as weapons, drugs, and alcohol, which is a well-supported outcome in the 
government transfer literature (Dobkin and Puller 2007, and Riddell and Riddell 2005). 
Because Jacob and Ludwig (2012) show that Section 8 voucher recipients work less hours, 
we also believe that additional leisure time contributes to this negative consequence as it 
affords recipients more time to socialize. If that socialization also includes drugs and 
alcohol, this is even more likely to be the case.  
We find that subgroups that are highly likely to respond such an income shock are 
driving the increase in violent crime arrests: males and individuals who had been arrested 
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at least once before receiving a voucher. Both groups are more likely to have ties to 
criminal gangs, facilitating criminal use of these new resources. Past arrestees may also 
have difficulty obtaining jobs due to past criminal convictions, leaving them more leisure 
time. 
The most striking and actionable result is that the recipients who had been arrested 
before receiving a voucher were more likely to be arrested for a violent crime due to 
receiving a voucher. The Department of Housing and Urban Development empowers local 
housing authorities to screen recipients based on past criminal history (HUD 2001), and 
the Houston Housing Authority does so in practice (HHA 2013). Voucher eligibility rules 
are focused on certain types of more serious crimes committed recently. (In Houston, 
applicants can be denied for a drug or violent crime in the past 5 years.) The policy 
implications of this result are simple and clear – these criteria may be too lax and housing 
authorities may be able to reduce this significant unintended consequence by further 
restricting eligibility on the basis of criminal history.  
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4. CAN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIM SCREENING AND ACTIVE SAFETY 
COUNSELING SAVE LIVES? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Although the rate of intimate partner violence in the United States has declined 
significantly over the last two decades (National Crime Victimization Survey, BJS, 2013), 
domestic violence still remains a serious social and public health problem. According to a 
2010 report based on the National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC 2010), one in three women in the US 
become victims of intimate partner violence during their lifetime. This abuse could 
escalate in many cases resulting in serious injuries and sometimes even death. While the 
overall rate of homicide is greater among men than among women, a far greater proportion 
of women are killed by their intimate partners than men. At least 35% of female homicide 
victims, over 1000 women every year, are identified as having been killed by their intimate 
partner (Supplementary Homicide Reports, 2000-11).32  
One strategy that policy makers have used to address this problem is to deter or 
incapacitate the offender through harsher penalties on acts of domestic violence. In this 
light, many states passed mandatory arrest laws that mandated warrantless arrests of 
suspects for every a domestic violence incident reported. However, Iyengar (2009) finds 
                                                 
32 Based on Supplementary Homicide Reports from 2000 to 2011, in about 35% of the female homicide 
cases, the victim is identified as the girlfriend or wife of the offender. In as many as 25% of the female 
homicide cases the relationship between the victim and offender is not known and in about 17% of the cases 
the victim is identified as an acquaintance or a friend of the offender. It is possible that many homicides in 
these groups could also be results of intimate partner violence. 
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that these laws had precisely the opposite effect, increasing intimate partner homicide 
among married couples by 60%. The author suggests that this increase is mostly a result 
of reduced reporting of domestic abuse by victims fearing the certain arrest of their partner 
and increased retribution from the abuser after the arrest. 
In this paper, I study a program that takes an alternate strategy of identifying and 
empowering the most high danger victims with the right resources in order to reduce 
intimate partner homicide. The Lethality Assessment Program (LAP) was developed by 
the Maryland Network Against Domestic Violence (MNADV) in 2005 and was thereafter 
implemented by all the law enforcement agencies in Maryland. The model provides police 
officers an objective scale to assess the risk after a domestic violence incident and identify 
the most high-danger victims based on their responses to the lethality assessment 
questionnaire. Once the victim is identified as having a high-risk of serious injury or death, 
the officer contacts a local domestic violence hotline, gets input from a counselor on the 
victim’s situation, and conveys a tailored safety plan to the victim, while encouraging her 
to speak with the counselor at every step. According to the statistics from MNADV from 
2006 to 2009, nearly 59% of the female victims (70 out of 100,000 population) who were 
screened as high risk chose to speak with a counselor and at least 17% (20 out of 100,000 
population) sought help at the shelter at a later time.  
While many instruments are available for different types of domestic violence risk 
assessment, none of them have been evaluated using experimental or quasi-experimental 
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techniques.33, 34 In the course of 11 years since it was piloted in 2005, the Lethality Screen 
instrument has garnered a lot attention, and the LAP has been implemented by numerous 
law enforcement agencies across 34 states. Recently, the Lethality Screen instrument has 
been studied in greater detail. Robinson, Pinchevsky, and Guthrie (2016) have studied the 
extent to which police officers agree with the importance of risk factors highlighted in the 
Lethality Screen in assessing the level of risk, and they find that the officers are generally 
in agreement. Through follow-up surveys of high danger victims before and after the 
implementation of LAP in select jurisdictions in Oklahoma, Messing et al. (2015) find that 
women who received the LAP intervention were significantly more likely to use protective 
services and less likely to be victims of physical violence than the comparison group that 
only received the standard police response. In a follow up study (Messing et al. 2016) the 
authors explore the variation in victim and law-enforcement agency characteristics and 
the associated variation in the utilization of services. 
The main challenge in addressing the question of the effectiveness of the LAP is that 
agencies that adopt the program choose to do so, and they might be different in observable 
                                                 
33 Different instruments are designed to serve different purposes, and they also differ in their methodologies 
and ease of use. MOSAIC-20 (De Becker and Associates) and Danger Assessment (Campbell et al. 2003; 
Campbell et al. 2007; Campbell 1994; Campbell 2001), on which the LAP is based, are some of the 
instruments that were developed to predict lethality or near lethality in domestic violence situations. Other 
instruments, such as SARA (Spousal Abuse Risk Assessment) (Kropp and Hart 2000) and the K-SID 
(Kingston-Screening Inventory for Domestic Violence) (Gelles & Straus 1990 as cited in Campbell et al. 
2005) were designed to screen offenders to predict their likelihood to re-assault. 
34 Researchers in criminology, public health and other fields have done predictive validation of many of 
these instruments including the Lethality Assessment (Campbell et al. 2005; Messing and Thaller 2013; 
Messing, Campbell, Wilson, et al. 2015). However, their focus is not on studying the effectiveness of the 
program in reducing or preventing future violence. 
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and unobservable ways from the agencies that do not adopt the program. Thus a cross-
sectional approach could suffer from a selection bias. 
In order to address this challenge and identify the causal effects of the Lethality 
Assessment Program on female homicide victimization, I exploit the within law 
enforcement agency variation in the timing of implementation of LAP in the state of 
Maryland. I use individual homicide level data from the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide 
Reports (SHR) from 2000 to 2011 and aggregate them to the agency level in order to 
measure the effects of the program using a difference-in-differences framework. The 
implicit assumption made in this framework is that agencies that adopted the LAP early 
would have experienced similar rates of female homicide victimization as agencies that 
adopted the program late, in the absence of the LAP. I perform various robustness checks 
and falsification exercises to test the validity of this assumption. The fact that early and 
late adopting agencies track each other in the rates of female homicides prior to treatment 
and that the inclusion of neither the time-varying confounding factors nor agency-specific 
linear time trends changes the estimated effects of LAP support the validity of my research 
design. 
Results indicate that the introduction of LAP significantly reduced female homicide 
victimization by males. Though the Supplementary Homicide Reports contain information 
about the relationship between the victim and the offender for a majority of the homicides, 
it is not clear which of the relationship categories might constitute an intimate partner 
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relationship.35 Accordingly, research has shown that only about 71% of intimate partner 
homicides are identified in the SHR data (Langford, Isaac, and Kabat 1998). To avoid 
relying on a subjectively defined relationship status for identifying intimate partner 
homicides, I focus on an objectively defined category that is likely to contain a large 
number of intimate partner homicides. This is the group of homicides with a female victim, 
who was in the age group of 18 to 60 at the time of death, was killed by a male offender, 
and not during the commission of a robbery.36 The details of the victim-offender 
relationships and circumstances of homicide in this category are shown in Figure C.1. 
According to Panel A over 55% of the victims in this category were either the wife or 
girlfriend of the offender. All of the circumstances listed in Panel B could be associated 
with an intimate partner homicide. The effect of LAP is also strong on this group of 
homicides. I find that LAP reduced female homicides committed by males by 35-45 
percent which is equivalent to a reduction of 2-3 deaths for every 1 million population. 
The central contribution of this paper is that I use a quasi-experimental difference-in-
differences approach to identify the causal role of the most popular domestic violence 
victim screening protocol in reducing domestic violence related deaths. The results 
showing significant effects of the LAP in reducing female homicide victimization have 
                                                 
35 When the victim is defined as the wife or girlfriend of the offender it is clear that the relationship is an 
intimate one. However, in nearly 17% of the cases where a female is killed by a male, the relationship is 
defined as an acquaintance (Figure C.1, Panel A). In these cases the nature of the relationship between the 
victim and offender are not clear.  
36 To zero in on intimate partner homicides, from the group of homicides where a male killed a female within 
the age group of 18 to 60, I excluded robberies, burglaries, sniper attacks, and police killings of felons. I 
explicitly mention robberies in the text as they formed the largest category of circumstances that was 
excluded. 
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important policy implications. These results imply that a more proactive approach by 
police in screening of domestic violence victims and empowering the most high-risk 
victims with a safety plan and other resources, together with a close cooperation between 
law enforcement agencies and local domestic violence programs, can play a very 
important role in saving the victims’ lives. 
4.2 Background on the Lethality Assessment Program 
The Lethality Assessment Program – Maryland Model, was developed by the 
Maryland Network Against Domestic Violence in 2005. The main goal of this program is 
to provide law enforcement officers and other community professionals with a 
standardized evidence based tool to screen the victims of domestic violence and 
objectively identify those most at risk of being killed or seriously injured by their intimate 
partners (Lethality Assessment, MNADV). 
The lethality assessment model consists of two parts: a lethality assessment 
questionnaire called the Lethality Screen for First Responders, which helps officers 
identify the victims with a high level of risk for lethality or near-lethality, and a referral 
protocol which is triggered when the victim is identified as high-danger. 
The Lethality Screen (Figure C.3) consists of eleven yes or no questions which seek 
to assess the nature of the domestic abuse. An affirmative answer to at least one of the first 
three questions or four of the next eight questions would suggest an imminent danger to 
the safety and survival of the victim. This screening tool is based on Danger Assessment, 
a screening instrument developed by Dr. Jacquelyn Campbell, of The Johns Hopkins 
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University School of Nursing, to help counselors and clinicians in assessing a victim’s 
risk of homicide or severe re-assault (Campbell 1994; Campbell et al. 2003). 
When the officer identifies the victim as high-danger, he follows the referral protocol. 
As a first step, the officer conveys to the victim that she has been screened as high-risk 
and that other women in her situation have died (Messing et al. 2016). The officer then 
places a phone call to the local 24-hour domestic violence hotline in order to obtain a 
safety plan for the victim and encourages her to speak with the trained hotline advocate. 
Irrespective of the victim’s decision to speak to the advocate, the officer informs the 
advocate about the victim’s situation including her responses on the lethality screen 
(Messing, Campbell, Wilson, et al. 2015). The advocate then provides a safety plan that is 
tailored to the victims’ circumstance, which is communicated to the victim whether or not 
she chooses to speak to the advocate. If the victim does speak with the advocate, in a brief 
conversation of approximately 10 minutes, the advocate attempts to gain the victim’s trust, 
convince her of the imminent danger she faces, provide a safety plan and actively 
encourage her to seek help from the local shelter (Messing et al. 2016).   
The implementation of LAP brings about many changes to the way domestic violence 
is addressed in the jurisdiction. Firstly, it provides police officers with an objective, well-
defined protocol to handle domestic violence incidents. It also mandates the police officers 
to take a more pro-active approach in connecting the victim to the domestic violence 
services as opposed to a passive approach of providing information about the local shelters 
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and leaving the decision of getting help entirely to the victim.37 Secondly, it fosters a 
strong relationship between law enforcement and the local domestic violence 
organization, thereby improving the preparedness of helplines and shelters to handle the 
volume of victims referred to them. Thirdly, at a victim level, implementation of LAP 
could significantly increase the victims’ likelihood to reach out to the shelters and seek 
their services. Since domestic violence victims often tend to underestimate the risk they 
face (Messing and Thaller 2013), a tool such as the Lethality Screen might help victims 
better evaluate their risk of being killed or seriously injured and hence convince them to 
seek help. 
4.3 Data 
The data on the timing of implementation of LAP by different law enforcement 
agencies is not available centrally with MNADV or any other associated organization. So, 
I collected this information for all the law enforcement agencies in Maryland serving a 
population of 10,000 or more.38 The list of all such agencies along with their LAP start 
dates is presented in Table C.1. I was unable to get the LAP implementation date for four 
agencies so these are not included in the sample. All of the 39 agencies that are included 
in the sample implemented LAP between 2005 and 2012. I restrict the period of study 
                                                 
37 As per my email communication with Mr. Dave Sargent, Retired Police Lieutenant and Senior Program 
Manager at MNADV, there was no consistency in the police officers’ approach to handling domestic 
violence calls prior to LAP. In most cases they would refer the victim to the nearest domestic violence 
program, and the referral could be written or verbal. This is also the typical response of law enforcement 
across the country. 
38 The sources of information include newsletters released by MNADV during the early days of LAP, 
individual law enforcement agencies, news articles, and the domestic violence helplines that are associated 
with specific agencies as part of the LAP. 
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from 2000 to 2011 during which 34 agencies started participating in LAP.  
MNADV reported statistics on the number of lethality screens conducted and the take 
up rate among high-risk victims in Maryland between 2006 and 2009 (Maryland Network 
Against Domestic Violence 2010). I present these statistics in Table C.2. The LAP was 
active in 88 law enforcement agencies in Maryland by the end of 2009. Every year, around 
220 victims reported domestic violence and were screened under LAP for every 100,000 
population. Of them, slightly over half (120 for every 100,000 population) were identified 
as high-danger. About 70 women in every 100,000 population spoke to the domestic 
violence hotline advocate and about 20 of them sought services.  
I use the Supplementary Homicide Reports of the FBI as the main source of homicide 
data. For every reported homicide, the SHR contains information on the date of the 
incident, reporting law enforcement agency, demographic information about the victims 
and offenders, and details about the relationship between them when available. Using this 
information, I construct an agency-level yearly panel on the counts of homicide within 
different categories.  
The summary statistics are presented in Table C.3. Statistics on the counts of different 
types of homicide for every 100,000 population in an agency-year are reported in Panel 
A. On average, there are over 4 homicides per 100,000 in an agency-year. Majority of the 
homicide victims are male and only 22% are female. Nearly a third of all female victims 
were identified as the wife or girlfriend of the offender. About half of the female victims 
were between 18 to 60 years of age and were killed by a male offender under 
circumstances other than the commission of a robbery. 
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Finally, I have county level data on important confounding factors that might influence 
the rate of homicide such as demographic and economic characteristics, rate of policing 
per capita, and implementation of other policies to curtail intimate partner homicide. 
Descriptive statistics of these time-varying county-level control variables are in Panel B 
of Table C.3. The data on agency-level population estimates are from the FBI’s Uniform 
Crime Reporting. County-level demographic variables have been calculated from the 1-
year population estimates in the American Community Survey. Information on the poverty 
rate and median household income is from the Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates 
(U.S. Census Bureau), and the unemployment rate is from the Local Area Unemployment 
Statistics (Beureau of Labor Statistics). Agency level police counts obtained from the 
Uniform Crime Reports are aggregated to the county level to get the county level policing 
rates per 100,000 population. Information on the institution dates of Fatality Review 
Teams in different counties across Maryland are available in the Maryland Domestic 
Violence Fatality Review Council’s newsletter (2012). 
4.4 Empirical Approach 
To identify the effect of the Lethality Assessment Program, I exploit the within-agency 
variation in the implementation of the program across all law enforcement agencies in 
Maryland with a population of 10,000 or more. I implement a difference-in-differences 
model which tests whether female homicide rates change differently in jurisdictions that 
adopted LAP early than in jurisdictions that adopted it late. Formally I estimate the 
following equation: 
𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐿𝐴𝑃𝑎𝑡 +  Ω𝑋𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃𝑎 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑎𝑡        (3.1) 
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where 𝐿𝐴𝑃𝑎𝑡 is the proportion of year t during which agency a was participating in LAP, 
𝑋𝑐𝑡 is the vector of county-level time-varying control variables and 𝜃𝑎 and 𝜏𝑡 are agency 
and year fixed effects respectively. The outcome variable 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡 is the count of 
homicides in the particular category in agency a in year t. Since this is a discrete variable 
and often there are zero female homicides in an agency-year cell, I estimate the model 
using a negative binomial regression by controlling for agency population on the right-
hand side as the exposure variable. Robust standard errors are clustered at the agency level 
allowing for within-agency errors to be correlated over time. 
In this difference-in-differences model, the underlying identifying assumption is that 
the rate of change of female homicides in jurisdictions that were late adopters of LAP 
provides a good counterfactual for the rate at which female homicides would have changed 
in the early adopting jurisdictions in the absence of LAP. 
I test this identifying assumption and also relax it in several ways. First, I perform a 
statistical test to check if the rate of female homicide in early adopting (treated) agencies 
diverges from the trend seen in the late adopting (control) agencies even before the 
implementation of LAP. I do this by including an indicator for the year prior to adoption 
for the treated agencies while estimating equation 3.1. Failure to find a statistically 
significant difference in outcomes between the treated and control agencies prior to the 
adoption would lend support to the validity of the identifying assumption. I also extend 
this test to compare the divergence in the outcome variable between the treated and control 
agencies for multiple years before adoption. If the identifying assumption holds then we 
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would expect the difference between early and late adopters to be close to zero before the 
implementation of LAP. 
Second, I test whether time-varying determinants of homicide rates are orthogonal to 
the within-agency variation in the adoption of LAP. If county-level observables, such as 
demographic composition, economic factors, and per-capita policing, vary differentially 
between the early and late adopting agencies alongside changes in the practice of LAP, 
then it would suggest that the female homicide rates might change in treated agencies 
differentially even in the absence of treatment. To ensure that this is not the case, I estimate 
equation 3.1 with and without these controls. I also include controls for the county-level 
incorporations of Fatality Review Teams to account for other contemporaneous policy 
changes within law enforcement agencies that might impact female homicides.39 Under a 
properly specified model with a reasonable identifying assumption, the regressions 
without and with controls should yield similar estimates of the effects of LAP on female 
homicides. 
Third, if along with implementing LAP, law enforcement agencies took other 
measures that affected the overall rate of homicide in early adopting agencies differently, 
then it would be a problematic to the identifying assumption. Hence, as a falsification 
exercise, I estimate the effect of implementing LAP on all homicides and homicides with 
                                                 
39 The Fatality Review Teams were instituted by different counties to review selected few domestic violence 
related deaths and identify possible changes to law enforcement practices that could prevent future 
occurrence of such incidents.  
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male victims. If the Lethality Assessment Program is not found to influence these 
outcomes, then it adds credence to the empirical approach. 
Finally, I relax the identifying assumption by estimating the model with controls for 
agency-specific linear time trends. This would test if the results in the main model could 
be biased by any differential trends between the early and late adopting agencies. 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Effect of Lethality Assessment on Female Homicide Victimization 
First, I present graphical evidence corresponding to the main difference-in-differences 
model. By including indicators for up to two years prior to the implementation of LAP 
and allowing for dynamic treatment effects after in equation 3.1, I estimate the pre- and 
post- treatment divergence in outcomes between the treated and control agencies. These 
differences are plotted in Figure C.2. Panel A shows the divergence in the rate of 
homicides with female victims and male offenders. In panel B I present the divergence in 
the rate of homicides with female victims aged 18 to 60, male offenders, and the 
circumstance not identified as a robbery. In both panels the difference between early and 
late adopting agencies is close to zero prior to treatment (data points to the left of the solid 
vertical line). The fact that the control and treatment groups are tracking each other prior 
to treatment corroborates the validity of the identifying assumption. Whereas, in the post 
treatment period (data points to the right of the solid vertical line), there is a large drop in 
both outcomes in the agencies that adopted LAP early in comparison to those that didn’t. 
This indicates that the introduction of LAP significantly reduced female homicide 
victimization.  
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I formally estimate the effect of LAP on female homicides using equation 3.1 and the 
results are presented in Table C.4. Panels A and B present results for the effect of LAP on 
all female homicides and on female homicides with male offenders respectively. Since I 
expect the effects of LAP to be concentrated on intimate partner homicides, in panel C, I 
present the effects of LAP on a narrowly defined category of female homicides. This 
category includes homicides where the victim was between 18 and 60 years of age, the 
offender was male, and the circumstance of homicide was not a robbery. Column 1 
presents the estimates from the negative binomial regression with controls for agency and 
year fixed effects. I progressively control for time-varying county-level covariates in 
columns 2 through 5. Columns 6 and 7 present estimates from robustness checks, namely, 
testing for pre-treatment divergence by including the lead indicator for treatment and 
allowing for a relaxed identifying assumption by including agency-specific linear time 
trends.  
In all the panels, the estimates change very little when I include controls or allow for 
agency-specific linear time trends. The coefficients on the lead indicator for treatment 
(LAP t-1) are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero in all cases. These results 
are consistent with the assumption that the late-adopting agencies are good counterfactuals 
for those that adopted LAP early. 
Results in panel A suggest that overall female homicide declined between 10 to 20 
percent due to the implementation of LAP, but not all estimates are statistically different 
from zero. Since the intervention is particularly targeted towards homicides that result 
from domestic violence, this result is understandable. In panel B where the outcome 
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variable is the female homicides committed by men, I find a stronger effect. All estimates 
from the main model (columns 1 through 5) are statistically significant at the 1% level, 
and they indicate a 35 to 45 percent drop in female homicide victimization by men as a 
result of LAP. The effects are also pronounced in panel C where I only include homicides 
of women aged 18 to 60, by men, and under circumstances other than a robbery. All 
estimates from the main model are statistically significant at least at the 5% level, and 
indicate that LAP reduced such homicides by around 42 percent. 
Research suggests that the rate of domestic violence could be different between 
married and cohabiting couples (e.g. Stets and Straus, 1989; Yllo and Straus, 1981). 
According to a report on intimate partner violence from the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
(BJS 1998) women in the age group of 16 to 24 experience the highest rate of violence. 
To the extent that younger women are less likely to be married this might suggest a higher 
rate of violence among unmarried couples. The rate of reporting abuse and utilizing 
domestic violence services could also be different between women that are married to their 
abusers and those that are not.40 Because the effectiveness of LAP depends on both those 
factors, I test for heterogeneous effects of LAP on intimate partner homicide by the 
relationship between the victim and the offender. The results are in Table C.5. Panels A 
and B are restricted to female homicides where the victim was the girlfriend and wife of 
                                                 
40 According to Ms. Kelley Rainey, Director of Domestic Violence Services at the Family and Children’s 
Services (FMC), Baltimore, MD, married women might have greater difficulty in leaving an abusive 
relationship because of several reasons (based on my phone communication with her). For instance, the 
finances may be more interlinked among married couples – the victim may not be able to get a bank account 
without getting noticed. Married women might also face a greater stigma while making the decision to leave 
their marriage because of domestic violence. 
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the male offender respectively.41 As shown in panel A of Figure C.1, among the female 
victims aged 18 to 60 that were killed by men in a situation other than a robbery, nearly 
17% were identified as acquaintances of the offender (third highest category after 
girlfriend and wife).42 The nature of the relationship between the victim and offender is 
not clear in these cases. For instance, a couple that was dating or seeing each other 
occasionally at the time of the homicide might be classified as acquaintances. So I include 
this category as the third subgroup in panel C.43 The estimates are large and statistically 
significant in panels A and C indicating that LAP is effective in saving lives of women 
who might have otherwise been killed by their boyfriends or male acquaintances. As for 
the women that are married to their abusers, estimates in panel B are positive and not 
statistically distinguishable from zero at the 5% level. This may be consistent with the idea 
that married women could be less willing or able to report domestic abuse or make 
attempts to escape an abusive relationship. 
4.5.2 Falsification: Effect of Lethality Assessment on all Homicides and Male Victims 
As seen in Table C.3, nearly 78% of all victims of homicide are male, and very few 
men are victims of intimate partner violence. If alongside LAP, law enforcement agencies 
take other steps to curb homicide or if homicide rates are declining differentially in early 
adopting agencies due to other external factors, then it would be difficult to disentangle 
                                                 
41 Homicides where the victim-offender relationship is defined as “Common-law Wife” and “Ex-wife” are 
included in the wife category. 
42 Homicides where the victim-offender relationship is defined as “Friend” and “Other known” are included 
in the acquaintance category. 
43 I limit this category to include only those cases where the victim was between the ages of 18 and 60 and 
there was no commission of a robbery. 
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the effects of LAP. To ensure that this is not the case, I repeat the same analysis for overall 
homicides and for homicides with male victims as a falsification exercise.  
The results are presented in Table C.6. Panel A shows the results for overall homicides 
and Panel B for homicides with male victims. The estimated effects of LAP on these 
homicide categories are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero under most 
specifications. Estimates are positive (opposite in direction to the main results) and 
statistically significant under the basic specification with only the agency and year fixed 
effects in column 1. Since the introduction of LAP is not found to cause a significant 
decline in the types of homicide that ought not to be affected by LAP, it strengthens my 
confidence in the research design. These results indicate that no other contemporaneous 
factors that would affect homicides overall could explain the drop in the female homicide 
victimization by men that are seen in the previous sections. 
4.5.3 Test of Attrition: County-level Analysis 
A potential concern for this study is attrition. If a high-risk victim leaves her original 
agency jurisdiction as a result of the safety counselling she receives under LAP and is then 
killed by her intimate partner, I would be unable to identify such deaths and account for 
them under the appropriate agencies.44 As a result, such an observed reduction of deaths 
in the jurisdiction due to migration after the introduction of LAP, would be falsely 
attributed to the program itself. 
                                                 
44 The Supplementary Homicide Reports do not contain information about the addresses of the offenders or 
victims. Even if such an address were to be recorded at the time of death, it might not be the original address 
where the victim was treated as a result of LAP. 
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In order to minimize the possible effects of attrition on the results, I repeat the 
empirical analysis at the county level. There are several reasons to expect the county-level 
analysis to effectively account for agency-level attrition, if any. Given that counties have 
a larger geographic area than the agency jurisdictions, it could be more likely that the 
mobility constrained victims of domestic violence remain within county lines after being 
treated under LAP, if not within agency lines. More importantly, agencies within a county 
are serviced by a domestic violence service program specifically assigned to that county. 
As per my communication with Ms. Kelley Rainey, Director of Domestic Violence 
Services at the Family and Children’s Services (FMC), Baltimore, MD, victims are 
unwilling to leave their home in most cases. If they do move into a shelter, which is usually 
in an undisclosed location, it is almost always into the shelter operated by the domestic 
violence organization in their county of origin. This is because most of these shelters 
operate under full capacity, and a victim is transferred outside the county only under dire 
circumstances. 
Results of the county-level analysis are presented in Table C.7. Because the 
implementation of LAP was at the agency level, treatment at the county level could be 
defined in multiple ways. In columns 1 and 2, the LAP treatment variable is defined as the 
proportion of the year for which the largest agency in the county had implemented LAP. 
In columns 3 and 4, the treatment variable is defined as the fraction of the county 
population treated in a given year, while adjusting for the month of implementation.45 The 
                                                 
45 Information on the county-level breakdown of LAP implementation dates by agency and percentages of 
county population covered by the agencies is presented in Table C.8. 
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odd numbered columns represent specifications with only the year and county fixed 
effects, and the even numbered columns represent specifications with both fixed effects 
and controls. Panels A, B, and C contain results for all female homicides, female 
homicides by men, and the subgroup with victim in the age group of 18 to 60 and the 
circumstance not being a robbery respectively. 
The county-level analysis yields results similar to those from the agency-level 
analysis. The rate of female homicide victimization by men is found to be 39 to 51 percent 
lower in counties after the implementation of LAP. If the high risk victims systematically 
moved out of the agency jurisdictions as a result of LAP but remained within the same 
county and got killed, then results at the county level would be more attenuated towards 
zero than results at the agency level. These results are consistent with the anecdotal 
evidence that very few victims are willing to leave their home to escape an abusive 
relationship.46 Thus, agency-level attrition cannot explain the steep reduction in female 
homicides after the implementation of LAP. 
4.6 Conclusion 
A shift in the public mindset about domestic violence from considering it a private 
family matter to identifying it as a crime and greater awareness about the extent of its 
damage led to an increase in various policies and programs aimed at addressing the 
problem in the early 1990s (Klein et al. 1997). Although the rates of intimate partner 
violence have declined since, it still remains the cause of over 35% of all female 
                                                 
46 In 2015, only 55 of the 461 high danger victims referred to FMC moved into a shelter. 
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homicides. Policies such as the mandatory and recommended arrest laws enacted to 
protect domestic violence victims by deterring or incapacitating the abuser have proved to 
be ineffective (Iyengar 2009). In contrast, this paper studies a police intervention called 
the Lethality Assessment Program that aims to reduce intimate partner homicide by 
identifying and empowering the most high-risk victims. 
Using data on individual homicides from the Supplemental Homicide Reports, I 
exploit the within law enforcement agency variation in the implementation of the LAP in 
Maryland to identify the effects of the program in reducing domestic violence related 
fatalities. I find that this intervention reduced female homicide victimization by men by 
35-45 percent. This reduction is equivalent to about 2-3 fewer deaths annually for every 1 
million population. If this program were to be scaled nationally with the same success as 
in Maryland, the estimates suggest that as many as 600 lives could be saved every year 
across the country. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this dissertation, I evaluate the effects of three public policies on important socio-
economic outcomes. Since it is usually infeasible to conduct experiments to evaluate such 
public policies I employ three different quasi-experimental techniques to be able to claim 
causal inference.  
I explore the causal role played by legal alcohol access in the spread of sexually 
transmitted diseases among the college-age population in the first chapter. Using 
administrative data on the number of gonorrhea cases diagnosed in men from California, 
I implement a regression discontinuity design to exploit the sudden change in legal alcohol 
access on an individual’s 21st birthday. Intuitively, I compare the number of gonorrhea 
cases diagnosed in individuals just below and above age 21. Since we do not expect any 
other determinants of sexually transmitted diseases to change discontinuously on exactly 
the 21st birthday of the individual, we can attribute any increase in STDs at this age cut 
off to the increased drinking at the MLDA. Contrary to the findings of related literature, I 
find no evidence of an increase in STDs at the MLDA. This suggests that the general 
consensus that alcohol plays a causal role in the spread of STDs, at least among the 
college-age population, is likely to be driven by selection into drinking. 
In the second chapter, we study the effect of the Section 8 housing voucher program 
on criminal outcomes of the adult recipients. By exploiting the variation in timing of 
enrollment that resulted from a randomized housing voucher lottery, we are able to 
identify the causal effects of the vouchers. We match two administrative datasets in this 
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project: arrest records from the Houston Police Department and data on the applicants to 
the Section 8 program along with their lottery and voucher use outcomes from the Houston 
Housing Authority. Since the lottery number influenced the timing of enrollment, we are 
able to compare the arrest outcomes of voucher recipients with low lottery numbers, who 
got the vouchers earlier, to those of recipients with high lottery numbers, who had to wait 
longer to get the voucher. Results indicate that the vouchers had unintended consequences. 
Individuals were more like to be arrested for violent crime after receiving the voucher, and 
this effect is manly driven by people with a history of arrest and by men. Since the voucher 
do not move to neighborhoods that are much better than their pre-voucher neighborhoods, 
but receive a sizeable income transfer, we attribute these results to the income shock. 
I assess the effectiveness of police intervention aimed at reducing intimate partner 
homicides, called the Lethality Assessment Program, in the third chapter. The LAP 
program, which was first developed in Maryland, has been adopted by law enforcement 
agencies across 34 states and has become the most popular domestic violence victim 
assistance program. As part of LAP, the victims are screened using a simple questionnaire 
and the most high-risk victims are identified. Following this, the law enforcement officer 
takes a proactive approach, calls the local domestic violence shelter, encourages the victim 
to seek help and provides her with a tailored safety plan. The program has multiple effects: 
it improves the response of law enforcement to domestic violence incidents, it fosters a 
close and cooperative relationship between law enforcement and the local domestic 
violence helpline, and it encourages the high-risk victims to seek help by providing them 
with an objective measure of the danger they face. In order to study the effects of this 
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program, I exploit the within-agency variation in the timing of implementation within 
Maryland in a difference-in-differences framework. Results indicate that the program 
reduced female homicide victimization by men by 35-45%. 
Overall, I study three public policies and find that they could have a variety of both 
intended and unintended effects on society. I conclude that apart from considering the 
costs and benefits of such programs, it is important for policy makers to strive to 
understand the mechanisms through which the policies/programs might influence 
behavior and the heterogeneity in the behavioral responses to the policies from different 
types of individuals. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Figure A.1: Discontinuity in the count of STD cases at age 21 
 
 
Notes: Each bubble represents the average count of STD cases in a 30 day block of age. 
The solid lines are second-order polynomials of age fitted to the count of cases on either 
side of the age 21 cutoff. 
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Figure A.2: Discontinuity in STDs at age 21 - By race 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Each bubble represents the average count of STD cases for the particular race in a 
30 day block of age. The solid lines are second-order polynomials of age fitted to the count 
of cases on either side of the age 21 cutoff.  
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Figure A.3: Discontinuity in STDs at age 21- By county groups with different infection 
rates 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Each bubble represents the average count of STD cases for the particular group of 
counties in a 30 day block of age. The solid lines are second-order polynomials of age 
fitted to the count of cases on either side of the age 21 cutoff. 
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Notes: All figures are derived from 67,443 cases of gonorrhea diagnosed in men of ages 
17 to 25 between 2000 and 2012 in the state of California. 
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Table A.2: Infection rates in California 
 
Notes: Rates are per 100,000 population. All figures are from the data table for gonorrhea 
published by the California Department of Public Health, STD Control Branch (data 
reported through 08/19/2013). 
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Table A.3: Effect of the MLDA on STDs - Discontinuity at age 21 
 
Notes: Each cell represents results from a separate regression estimating equation 1.2. Unit 
of observation is the normalized age in days. Panel A presents results from log-linear 
regressions where the dependent variable is the log of the STD count. Panel B presents 
results from negative binomial regressions where the dependent variable is the STD count. 
Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis.  
  
 92 
 
Table A.4: Discontinuity in STDs at age 21 - By race 
 
Notes: Each cell represents results from a separate regression estimating equation 1.2. Unit 
of observation is the normalized age in days. Panel A, B and C present results for Whites, 
Blacks and Hispanics respectively. All results are from negative binomial regressions 
where the dependent variables are the STD counts in each of the race categories. Robust 
standard errors are presented in parenthesis. 
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Table A.5: Discontinuity in STDs at age 21 - By county groups with different infection 
rates 
 
Notes: Each cell represents results from a separate regression estimating equation 1.2. Unit 
of observation is the normalized age in days. The panels present results for groups of 
counties from the highest to lowest infection rates. Panel A is for the top 3 counties with 
the highest infection rates in California. Panel B is for the top 4 to 10 counties by infection 
rate and Panel C is for the rest of the counties. All results are from negative binomial 
regressions where the dependent variables are the STD counts in each group of counties. 
Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. 
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APPENDIX B 
       
Figure B.1: Lottery and voucher service processes 
a. Lottery process 
 
b. Voucher service process 
 
 
  
 95 
 
Figure B.2: Heat maps of application and voucher use addresses 
a. Distribution of Application Addresses 
 
b. Distribution of Voucher Use Addresses 
 
Notes: The heat maps are created in ArcMap using a point density operation that creates 
a grid over the map and then counts the number of address points within each grid cell. 
The outline indicates the boundaries of the police beats of the Houston Police Department. 
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Figure B.3: Take-up rates across lottery numbers 
 
Notes: Each bubble represents the percentage of lease-up within bins of about 980 
applicants. 
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Figure B.4: Test of randomization: Distribution of pre-lottery characteristics 
 
a. Criminal history 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Demographics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Each bubble represents the local average of the variable within bins of about 250 
individuals. Criminal history variables represent the probability of arrest in the crime 
category between 2002 and 2006. 
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Figure B.5: Test for attrition - Likelihood of voter registration and voting in Houston in 
2012 across lottery numbers 
 
 
Notes: Each bubble represents the local percentage of recipients that were registered to 
vote and that voted in Houston in 2012 within bins of about 250 individuals. 
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Table B.1: Comparison of application and voucher use addresses for recipients 
 
Notes: Statistics are shown for voucher recipients for whom both pre and post-lottery 
addresses were available and geocodable. Crime rates at the police division level are from 
2000 to 2005. 
Significance: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level 
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Table B.2: Pre-lottery descriptive statistics 
 
Notes: Lottery numbers are classified as low or high based on whether they are below or above the median (11896). 
Neighborhood crime rates are annual rates reported at the police division level from 2000 to 2005. 
Significance: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level 
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Table B.3: Post-lottery descriptive statistics [2010 Q1 to 2011 Q3] 
 
Notes: Lottery numbers are classified as low or high based on whether they are below or above the median (11896). Unit of 
observation is a person-quarter. Statistics are derived from all the quarters after 2009. 
Significance: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level 
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Table B.4: Test of randomization 
 
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression, estimating equation 2.1 with the 
observed covariates as the dependent variables. Unit of observation is an individual. 
Column 1 shows the coefficients of lottery number scaled down by 1000 and column 2 
shows coefficients of the quarter in which the voucher is serviced. Robust standard errors 
are presented in parentheses. 
Significance: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level 
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Table B.5: First stage - Relationship between voucher service and lease-up 
 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression estimating equation 2.2 with the 
indicator for post lease-up as the dependent variable. Controls include age at the time of 
the lottery, number of bedrooms and a dummy indicating an arrest in the 5 years prior to 
the lottery. Unit of observation is a person-quarter. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 
individual level, are presented in parentheses. 
Significance: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level 
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Table B.6: Effect of voucher service on crime - By crime type 
 
Notes: Each column within a panel represents a separate regression estimating equation 
2.2. The dependent variables in Panels A through D are dummy variables indicating an 
arrest in the person-quarter for any offense, violent offense, drug related offense, and 
financially motivated offense respectively. Pre-lottery mean is the mean of quarterly 
probability of arrest in the crime category from the year 2006. Controls include age at the 
time of the lottery, number of bedrooms and a dummy indicating an arrest in the crime 
category in the 5 years prior to the lottery. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 
individual level, are presented in parentheses.  
Significance: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level 
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Table B.7: Effect of voucher service on crime - By time since voucher service 
 
Notes: Each column within a panel represents a separate regression estimating a version 
of equation 2.2 with the independent variable split up by duration since voucher service. 
Pre-lottery mean is the mean of quarterly probability of arrest in the crime category from 
the year 2006. Controls include age at the time of the lottery, number of bedrooms and a 
dummy indicating an arrest in the crime category in the 5 years prior to the lottery. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are presented in parentheses.  
Significance: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level  
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Table B.8: Effect of voucher service on crime - Subgroup analysis 
 
Notes: Each column within a panel represents a separate regression estimating equation 
2.2 within a subgroup. Every pair of columns present heterogeneous effects of the 
vouchers within subgroups by criminal history, gender, and change of address 
respectively. The dependent variables in Panels A through D are dummy variables 
indicating an arrest in the person-quarter for any offense, violent offense, drug related 
offense, and financially motivated offense respectively. Pre-lottery mean is the mean of 
quarterly probability of arrest in the crime category for the particular subgroup from the 
year 2006. Controls include age at the time of the lottery, number of bedrooms and a 
dummy indicating an arrest in the crime category in the 5 years prior to the lottery. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are presented in parentheses.  
Significance: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level  
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Table B.9: Test of differential attrition across lottery numbers - Registration and voting in 
2012 
 
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression, estimating equation 2.1 with indicators 
for being registered and having voted in 2012 as the dependent variables in columns 1 and 
2, respectively. Unit of observation is an individual. Panel A shows the coefficients for 
lottery number scaled down by 1000 and Panel B shows coefficients for the voucher 
service quarter. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
Significance: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level 
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Table B.10: Intent to treat estimates with controls and leads 
 
Notes: Each column within a panel represents a separate regression estimating equation 
2.2. In column 3, indicators for 1-2 quarters before voucher service (announcement effect) 
and 3-4 quarters before voucher service (leads testing for pre-treatment trends) are 
included. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are presented in 
parentheses.  
Significance: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level 
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Table B.11: Intent to treat estimates with controls for neighborhood characteristics 
 
Notes: Each column within a panel represents a separate regression estimating equation 
2.2 with a different set of control variables. Main controls include age at the time of the 
lottery, number of bedrooms and a dummy indicating arrest in the crime category in the 5 
years prior to the lottery. Demographic controls include percent black, percent Hispanic, 
unemployment rate, median household income and poverty rate for the census tract of the 
individual's application address. Crime controls include rates for overall crime, violent 
and property crimes per 1000 people in the police division of the individual's application 
address. To maintain the number of observations constant across specifications, we 
include dummy variables indicating whether the demographic or crime controls are 
missing. The dependent variables in Panels A through D are dummy variables indicating 
an arrest in the person-quarter for any offense, violent offense, drug related offense, and 
financially motivated offense respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 
individual level, are presented in parentheses. 
Significance: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level 
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Table B.12: Effects of voucher service on crime - For individuals registered to vote in 
2012 
 
Notes: Each column within a panel represents a separate regression estimating equation 2 
for the subset of voucher recipients that were registered to vote in 2012 in Houston. The 
dependent variables in Panels A through D are dummy variables indicating an arrest in the 
person-quarter for any offense, violent offense, drug related offense, and financially 
motivated offense respectively. Controls include age at the time of the lottery, number of 
bedrooms and a dummy indicating an arrest in the crime category in the 5 years prior to 
the lottery. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are presented in 
parentheses.  
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Table B.13: Effect of voucher service on crime - Additional subgroups 
 
Notes: Each column within a panel represents a separate regression estimating equation 
2.2 within a subgroup. Every pair of columns present heterogeneous effects of the 
vouchers within subgroups by criminal history, gender, and change of address 
respectively. The dependent variables in Panels A through D are dummy variables 
indicating an arrest in the person-quarter for any offense, violent offense, drug related 
offense, and financially motivated offense respectively. Pre-lottery mean is the mean of 
quarterly probability of arrest in the crime category for the particular subgroup from the 
year 2006. Controls include age at the time of the lottery, number of bedrooms and a 
dummy indicating an arrest in the crime category in the 5 years prior to the lottery. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are presented in parentheses.  
Significance: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level  
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APPENDIX C 
      
Figure C.1: Distribution of the victim-offender relationship and circumstance of homicide 
– In cases with female victim aged 18 to 60, male offender, and not during a robbery 
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Figure C.2: Divergence in log homicide rates with female victims and male 
offenders before and after adoption of LAP 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows the coefficients for the leading indicators and lagged treatment 
effects from negative binomial regressions, accounting for agency and year fixed effects 
and covariates. Time-varying controls include median income, poverty rate, 
unemployment rate, demographics, policing rate and control for the institution of a fatality 
review team in the county. All coefficients are estimated relative to the difference between 
the treatment and control groups in the period 3 or more years before treatment. Hence 
the first data point is fixed to zero. 
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Figure C.3: Lethality Screen document 
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Table C.1: List of agencies in Maryland with at least 10,000 population and their LAP 
implementation dates 
Agency County LAP start date In sample Treated 
Kent County Sheriff's Office Kent October 2005 Yes Yes 
Cambridge Police Department Dorchester November 2005 Yes Yes 
Frederick Police Department Frederick November 2005 Yes Yes 
Hagerstown Police Department Washington November 2005 Yes Yes 
Harford County Sheriff's Office Harford November 2005 Yes Yes 
Queen Anne's County Sheriff's Office Queen Anne's November 2005 Yes Yes 
Easton Police Department Talbot February 2006 Yes Yes 
Garrett County Sheriff's Office Garrett February 2006 Yes Yes 
Talbot County Sheriff's Office Talbot February 2006 Yes Yes 
Baltimore Police Department Baltimore (city) April 2006 Yes Yes 
Calvert County Sheriff's Office Calvert May 2006 Yes Yes 
Cumberland Police Department Allegany May 2006 Yes Yes 
Washington County Sheriff's Office Washington May 2006 Yes Yes 
Cecil County Sheriff's Office Cecil July 2006 Yes Yes 
Elkton Police Department Cecil July 2006 Yes Yes 
Frederick County Sheriff's Office Frederick July 2006 Yes Yes 
Annapolis Police Department Anne Arundel July 2007 Yes Yes 
Anne Arundel County Sheriff's Office Anne Arundel July 2007 Yes Yes 
Caroline County Sheriff's Office Caroline 2007 Yes Yes 
Dorchester County Sheriff's Office Dorchester 2007 Yes Yes 
Howard County Sheriff's Office Howard January 2008 Yes Yes 
Gaithersburg Police Department Montgomery August 2008 Yes Yes 
Montgomery County Sheriff's Office Montgomery August 2008 Yes Yes 
Rockville Police Department Montgomery August 2008 Yes Yes 
Takoma Park Police Department Montgomery August 2008 Yes Yes 
St. Mary's County Sheriff's Office St. Mary's 2008 Yes Yes 
Baltimore County Sheriff's Office Baltimore May 2009 Yes Yes 
Somerset County Sheriff's Office Somerset May 2009 Yes Yes 
State Police: Carroll County Carroll July 2009 Yes Yes 
Westminster Police Department Carroll July 2009 Yes Yes 
Charles County Sheriff's Office Charles October 2009 Yes Yes 
Aberdeen Police Department Harford December 2009 Yes Yes 
Wicomico County Sheriff's Office Wicomico 2009 Yes Yes 
Worcester County Sheriff's Office Worcester 2009 Yes Yes 
College Park Police Department Prince George's December 2012 Yes No 
Greenbelt Police Department Prince George's December 2012 Yes No 
Hyattsville Police Department Prince George's December 2012 Yes No 
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Laurel Police Department Prince George's December 2012 Yes No 
Prince George's County Sheriff's Office Prince George's December 2012 Yes No 
Havre De Grace Police Department Harford Unknown No - 
Ocean Pines Police Department Worcester Unknown No - 
Salisbury Police Department Wicomico Unknown No - 
State Police: Allegany County Allegany Unknown No - 
 
Notes: The start dates were compiled by the author from different sources such as 
newsletters from MNADV, police department websites, and emails from police 
departments and associated domestic violence helplines. The last two columns provide 
information about the treatment status of each agency in the sample and within the period 
of study. For four of the agencies with a population of 10,000 or more, the LAP 
implementation date is not known. So, these agencies are excluded from all the analyses. 
For 5 more agencies, the implementation year is known but the month is not. In these 
cases, July (mid-year) is assumed to be the month of implementation.  
 
Table C.2: Lethality screening and counselling statistics from 2006 to 2009 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
Four-year 
average 
Panel A: Overall Statistics      
Number of agencies 21 43 68 88  
Population being served (in 1000) 807 1725 3198 4228.5 
 
Number of lethality screens 1839 3304 6788 10497 
 
Number of high danger victims 990 1923 3713 5443 
 
Number of non-high danger victims 698 1179 2589 4315 
 
Number that refused the screening 151 202 486 739 
 
Number that spoke to the counselor 531 1030 2207 3322 
 
Number that sought services 158 263 621 1030 
 
      
Panel B: Statistics for every 100,000 population 
Number of lethality screens 228 192 212 248 220 
Number of high danger victims 123 111 116 129 120 
Number that spoke to the counselor 66 60 69 79 69 
Number that sought services 20 15 19 24 20 
 
     
Notes: All statistics are from the Lethality Assessment information packet prepared by 
MNADV in 2010  
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Table C.3: Summary statistics 
  Mean Std. Dev.  Range 
Panel A: Agency-level dependent variables: Homicides 
per 100k population 
 
  
All homicides 4.17 7.36 0 - 46.78 
Male victim 3.25 6.65 0 - 43.09 
Female victim 0.93 1.77 0 - 9.19 
Female victim and male offender 0.67 1.50 0 - 9.19 
Female victim aged 18 to 60, male offender, not a robbery 0.44 1.18 0 - 9.19 
Female victim was wife/girlfriend of offender 0.29 0.98 0 - 9.19 
Female victim was girlfriend of offender 0.14 0.68 0 - 9.19 
Female victim was wife of offender 0.16 0.72 0 - 8.13 
Female victim aged 18 to 60, was an acquaintance of male 
offender, not a robbery 0.10 0.52 0 - 5.8 
 
   
Panel B: County-level control variables    
Population (within agency jurisdiction) 138431 228072 10877 - 962146 
% Black 22.5 20.2 0.4 - 66.2 
% White 72.0 21.4 26.1 - 98.9 
% Male 48.8 1.3 46.6 - 53.8 
% White male 35.4 10.3 13.7 - 49 
% Black male 10.8 9.3 0.3 - 30.6 
Poverty rate 8.9 4.2 3.7 - 26.2 
Unemployment rate 5.1 2.0 2.5 - 13.6 
Median household income ($1000) 60.6 17.2 28.2 - 102 
Number of police per 100k population 165.3 71.0 26.7 - 508.1 
Fatality review team in the county 0.33 0.47 0 - 1 
 
   
Notes: Summary statistics have been calculated from 468 observations which include data 
from 39 agencies over 12 years. All the dependent variables are annual counts of homicide 
per 100,000 population calculated from the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports. 
Except for population, the rest of the independent variables are at the county level. Agency 
level population data are from and population estimates of the FBI. Demographic 
information is derived from county-level population estimates from the Census. Poverty 
and income information are from the Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates. 
Unemployment rates are from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics of the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. Police counts are from FBI’s UCR. 
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Table C.4: Effect of LAP on female homicide victimization 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Panel A: Log homicide rate - Female victim 
LAP -0.117 -0.110 -0.118 -0.200** -0.190* -0.208** -0.328* 
 (0.130) (0.0816) (0.0886) (0.102) (0.110) (0.0961) (0.194) 
LAP t-1      -0.0292  
       (0.139)  
Panel B: Log homicide rate - Female victim and male offender 
LAP -0.366*** -0.318*** -0.355*** -0.450*** -0.444*** -0.432*** -0.477* 
 (0.136) (0.118) (0.129) (0.140) (0.147) (0.137) (0.263) 
LAP t-1      0.0188  
       (0.197)  
Panel C: Log homicide rate - Female victim aged 18 to 60, male offender, not a robbery 
LAP -0.381*** -0.422*** -0.421** -0.433** -0.416** -0.489** -0.575* 
 (0.100) (0.162) (0.174) (0.214) (0.212) (0.219) (0.336) 
LAP t-1      -0.108  
       (0.260)  
Observations 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 
Agencies 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Agency and year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Economic controls   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Policing controls    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Policy controls     Yes Yes Yes 
Agency specific linear 
time trends       Yes 
         
Notes: Each column in each panel represents a separate regression. The unit of observation 
is an agency-year. Robust standard errors are clustered at the agency level. Time-varying 
controls include median income, poverty rate, unemployment rate, demographics, 
policing rate and a dummy variable indicating the presence of a domestic violence fatality 
review team in the county. 
Significance: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level 
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Table C.5: Effect of LAP on female homicide victimization – By relationship with male 
offender 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Panel A: Log homicide rate - Female victim was girlfriend of male offender 
LAP -0.602* -0.569** -0.683** -1.086*** -1.040*** -1.119*** -0.802 
 (0.323) (0.281) (0.266) (0.329) (0.317) (0.350) (0.500) 
LAP t-1      -0.0980  
       (0.303)  
Panel B: Log homicide rate - Female victim was wife of male offender 
LAP 0.382 0.329 0.311 0.546 0.669* 0.635 0.923 
 (0.335) (0.344) (0.367) (0.382) (0.390) (0.427) (0.639) 
LAP t-1      -0.0595  
       (0.228)  
Panel C: Log homicide rate - Female victim aged 18 to 60, was acquaintance of male offender, not a robbery 
LAP -0.874** -0.866* -0.884** -0.895* -1.015** -1.171** -1.052 
 (0.423) (0.451) (0.438) (0.466) (0.448) (0.547) (1.060) 
LAP t-1      -0.249  
       (0.511)  
Observations 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 
Agencies 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Agency and year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Economic controls   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Policing controls    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Policy controls     Yes Yes Yes 
Agency specific linear 
time trends       Yes 
                
Notes: Each column in each panel represents a separate regression. The unit of observation 
is an agency-year. Robust standard errors are clustered at the agency level. Time-varying 
controls include median income, poverty rate, unemployment rate, demographics, 
policing rate and control for the institution of a fatality review team in the county.  
Significance: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level 
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Table C.6: Falsification - Effect of LAP on all homicides and male homicide victimization 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Panel A: Log homicide rate 
LAP 0.0614** 0.0389 0.0452 -0.0210 -0.0196 -0.0501 0.0685 
 (0.0271) (0.0664) (0.0657) (0.0775) (0.0768) (0.0746) (0.122) 
LAP t-1      -0.0484  
      (0.0563)  
Panel B: Log homicide rate - Male victim 
LAP 0.0870* 0.0352 0.0470 0.0105 0.0107 -0.0360 0.191 
 (0.0488) (0.0685) (0.0688) (0.0889) (0.0877) (0.0871) (0.121) 
LAP t-1      -0.0706  
      (0.0523)  
        
Observations 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 
Agencies 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Agency and year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Economic controls   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Policing controls    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Policy controls     Yes Yes Yes 
Agency specific linear time 
trends       Yes 
                
Notes: Each column in each panel represents a separate regression. The unit of observation 
is an agency-year. Robust standard errors are clustered at the agency level. Time-varying 
controls include median income, poverty rate, unemployment rate, demographics, 
policing rate and control for the institution of a fatality review team in the county.  
Significance: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level 
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Table C.7: County-level analysis 
  
1 2 3 4   
Panel A: Log homicide rate - Female victim  
LAP -0.0961 -0.144 -0.171* -0.210*  
 (0.108) (0.116) (0.0973) (0.124)  
Panel B: Log homicide rate - Female victim and male offender  
LAP -0.389*** -0.436*** -0.481*** -0.509***  
 (0.141) (0.134) (0.152) (0.143)  
Panel C: Log homicide rate - Female victim aged 18 to 60, male offender, not a robbery  
LAP -0.392*** -0.381** -0.508*** -0.493***  
 (0.103) (0.192) (0.106) (0.191)  
           
Observations 288 288 288 288  
Counties 24 24 24 24  
County and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Controls  Yes  Yes  
County treated when largest agency 
implements LAP Yes Yes    
County treated proportional to the 
fraction of the population treated   Yes Yes  
            
Notes: Each column in each panel represents a separate regression. In columns 1 and 2, 
the treatment is defined as the proportion of the year during which the largest law 
enforcement agency in the county is treated. In columns 3 and 4, the treatment is scaled 
by the proportion of the county population that is treated. The unit of observation is an 
agency-year. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. Time-varying 
controls include median income, poverty rate, unemployment rate, demographics, 
policing rate and control for the institution of a fatality review team in the county. 
Significance: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level 
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Table C.8: LAP implementation dates for agencies by county 
County Agency name 
Largest 
known 
agency 
Percentage 
of population 
in agency LAP start date 
Allegany Cumberland Police Department Yes 29 May 2006 
Anne Arundel Anne Arundel County Police Department Yes 92 July 2007 
Anne Arundel Annapolis Police Department No 7 July 2007 
Baltimore Baltimore County Police Department Yes 100 May 2009 
Baltimore (city) Baltimore Police Department Yes 100 April 2006 
Calvert Calvert County Sheriff's Office Yes 99 May 2006 
Caroline Caroline County Sheriff's Office Yes 69 2007 
Carroll State Police: Carroll County Police Yes 77 July 2009 
Carroll Westminster Police Department No 11 July 2009 
Cecil Cecil County Sheriff's Office Yes 77 July 2006 
Cecil Elkton Police Department No 14 July 2006 
Charles Charles County Sheriff's Office Yes 94 October 2009 
Dorchester Cambridge Police Department No 36 November 2005 
Dorchester Dorchester County Sheriff's Office Yes 58 2007 
Frederick Frederick Police Department No 27 November 2005 
Frederick Frederick County Sheriff's Office Yes 67 July 2006 
Garrett Garrett County Sheriff's Office Yes 94 February 2006 
Harford Harford County Sheriff's Office Yes 83 November 2005 
Harford Aberdeen Police Department No 6 December 2009 
Howard Howard County Police Department Yes 99 January 2008 
Kent Kent County Sheriff's Office Yes 68 October 2005 
Montgomery Montgomery County Police Department Yes 98 August 2008 
Montgomery Gaithersburg Police Department No 6 August 2008 
Montgomery Rockville Police Department No 5 August 2008 
Montgomery Takoma Park Police Department No 2 August 2008 
Prince George's Prince George's County Police Department Yes 85 December 2012 
Prince George's College Park Police No 3 December 2012 
Prince George's Greenbelt Police Department No 3 December 2012 
Prince George's Hyattsville Police Department No 2 December 2012 
Prince George's Laurel Police Department No 2 December 2012 
Queen Anne's Queen Anne's County Sheriff's Office Yes 95 November 2005 
Somerset Somerset County Sheriff's Office Yes 23 May 2009 
St. Mary's St. Mary's County Sheriff's Office Yes 100 2008 
Talbot Talbot County Sheriff's Office Yes 59 February 2006 
Talbot Easton Police Department No 35 February 2006 
Washington Hagerstown Police Department No 28 November 2005 
Washington Washington County Sheriff's Office Yes 69 May 2006 
Wicomico Wicomico County Sheriff's Office Yes 65 2009 
Worcester Worcester County Sheriff's Office Yes 40 2009 
     
 
 
